
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

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1 GOVERNANCE, ORDER, AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

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At a time when hegemons are declining, when boundaries (and the walls that seal them) are disappearing, when the squares of the world's cities are crowded with citizens challenging authorities, when military alliances are losing their viability – to mention but a few of the myriad changes that are transforming world politics – the prospects for global order and governance have become a transcendent issue. As the scope of the transformation widens and as its pace intensifies, the more urgent do questions about the nature of order and governance become. Change means the attrition of established patterns, the lessening of order, and the faltering of governance, until such time as new patterns can form and get embedded in the routines of world politics. Such is the situation today. One senses that the course of history is at a turning point, a juncture where the opportunities for movement toward peaceful cooperation, expanded human rights, and higher standards of living are hardly less conspicuous than the prospects for intensified group conflicts, deteriorating social systems, and worsening environmental conditions. Either set of arrangements – and possibly both – could evolve as leaders and publics get accustomed to the heady realization that some control over the future has been regained as a consequence of all the changes.

The goal of the collaborative project that resulted in the ensuing chapters is precisely that of seizing upon this time of change as a chance to clarify the nature of global order and the processes through which governance occurs on a worldwide scale. We do not seek to anticipate the specific forms of order and governance that are likely to emerge out of the rubble of the Cold War or the military conflict in the Persian Gulf. It may be years before the outlines of such an order evolve. But the present dynamics of change and statics of continuity are so arresting as to highlight a number of crucial questions that will surely frame our grasp of what lies ahead. What do we mean by governance on a global scale? How can it operate without government? If governance connotes a system of rule, and if it is not sustained by an organized government, who makes and implements the rules? Does the prevailing global order

depend on the nature and extensiveness of governance? Indeed, to what does global order refer? What forms can it take? Is global order a mental construct, an ideational image of how things work? Is it an implicit and largely unrecognized complex of norms that limits and shapes the conduct of international actors? Or does it consist of patterns and regularities that are empirically discernible? Can extensive, disorderly conflict be considered a form of order? Or is order founded on normative considerations that stress cooperation and preclude the notion of a conflict-ridden and chaotic order? Can there be global order during a period of rapid change? And how is order to be distinguished from stability and the interests and material conditions on which it rests?

There is no lack of attention to these questions in the international relations (IR) literature.¹ Unlike the ensuing essays, however, most prior attempts to delineate global order have not been propelled by a world undergoing change in the fundamental arrangements through which the course of events unfolds. Our advantage is the perplexity induced by recent developments, an awe that enables us to pose questions that might not otherwise get asked and to identify alternative lines of development that might not otherwise get explored.

The questions proved easier to ask than to answer, however. We met to discuss them on five separate occasions over the course of four years and each time we found the answers elusive, partly because our collective focus on the concepts of order, governance, institutions, and polyarchy varied from meeting to meeting and partly because we encountered nuances of difference among ourselves as to the essential scope and content of these key concepts. Some of these nuances remain. A careful reading of the several chapters will reveal we preferred to allow for different emphases rather than straining to converge around a watered down consensual formulation.

But it is important not to be misled by the nuanced differences. We may differ somewhat in our use of concepts and terminology, but we are concerned about the same problems. We share a view of the central issues that confront analysts who seek to develop an understanding of the emergent structures of world politics. Most notably, we agree that in a world where authority is undergoing continuous relocation – both outward toward supranational entities and inward toward subnational

¹ For two comprehensive inquiries into the nature of international order, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), and Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

groups – it becomes increasingly imperative to probe how governance can occur in the absence of government.

Given both our differences and shared conceptions, the task of this introductory chapter follows. It seeks to highlight the range of meanings encompassed by our collective concerns and to indicate how the various chapters fit together into a coherent whole.

GOVERNANCE AND ORDER

To presume the presence of governance without government is to conceive of functions that have to be performed in any viable human system irrespective of whether the system has evolved organizations and institutions explicitly charged with performing them. Among the many necessary functions, for example, are the needs wherein any system has to cope with external challenges, to prevent conflicts among its members or factions from tearing it irretrievably apart, to procure resources necessary to its preservation and well-being, and to frame goals and policies designed to achieve them. Whether the systems are local or global in scope, these functional needs are ever present if a system is to persist intact through time.

Activities designed to service a system's functional necessities are readily self-evident in the operations of governments which, normally, either evolve constitutions to regulate their conduct domestically or sign treaties to guide their performance internationally. During the present period of rapid and extensive global change, however, the constitutions of national governments and their treaties have been undermined by the demands and greater coherence of ethnic and other subgroups, the globalization of economies, the advent of broad social movements, the shrinking of political distances by microelectronic technologies, and the mushrooming of global interdependencies fostered by currency crises, environmental pollution, terrorism, the drug trade, AIDS, and a host of other transnational issues that are crowding the global agenda. These centralizing and decentralizing dynamics have undermined constitutions and treaties in the sense that they have contributed to the shifts in the loci of authority. Governments still operate and they are still sovereign in a number of ways; but, as noted above, some of their authority has been relocated toward sub-national collectivities. Some of the functions of governance, in other words, are now being performed by activities that do not originate with governments.

What, then, is an appropriate way of formulating the concept of governance as it operates in world politics? Is it merely a synonym for

international institutions and regimes? Can governance be effective in the absence of central authority? To what extent is the stability of a global order dependent on the presence of governance?

Such questions invite a lengthy disquisition on the nature of government and how sovereign national systems are so much more conducive to governmental operations than international systems that are not endowed with sovereign powers. And, indeed, the collapse of the Cold War and the many other changes that mark our time readily justify such a disquisition. Given the profound transformations in the nature and location of authority, legitimacy, and compliance, and given the emergent roles and structures of the modern state, transnational organizations, social movements, common markets, and political parties, the basis for extensive re-examinations of government and governance in an increasingly interdependent world is surely compelling. Obviously, however, this is not the occasion to undertake this task. Here we can only take note of possible meanings of governance in the emergent international context and how it is linked into the prevailing order and the prospects for change.²

As indicated by the title of this book, governance is not synonymous with government. Both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants.

Governance is thus a system of rule that is as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters. Put more emphatically, governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects), whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their policies. In this sense

² For another, more extensive and cogent inquiry into the meaning of the governance concept, see Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "What Is International Governance?," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (Vancouver: March 21, 1991).

governance is always effective in performing the functions necessary to systemic persistence, else it is not conceived to exist (since instead of referring to ineffective governance, one speaks of anarchy or chaos). Governments, on the other hand, can be quite ineffective without being regarded as non-existent (they are viewed simply as "weak"). Thus it is possible to conceive of governance without government – of regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority.

Nor is it far-fetched to derive from this line of reasoning a plausible scenario marked by government without governance. Indeed, if one ponders all the deeply divided countries whose politics are paralyzed and stalemated, it can readily be concluded that the world is populated with more than a few formal authorities who lack the regulatory mechanisms to function effectively, that is, with governments without governance. One might even argue, given all the noxious policies governments pursue, that governance without government is in some ways preferable to governments that are capable of governance. As one exasperated analyst has succinctly and tellingly observed, "Governance has been usurped by governments."³

To suggest that governance is always effective is to posit a close link between governance and order. It might even be said that governance is order plus intentionality. Global order consists of those routinized arrangements through which world politics gets from one moment in time to the next. Some of the arrangements are fundamental (such as the dispersion of power among key actors, the hierarchical differences among them, the rules which bound their interactions, and the premises they share about the role of force, diplomacy, cooperation, and conflict) and some are quite routinized (such as trade, postal, and passport procedures). But irrespective of whether they are fundamental or routinized, not all of the arrangements are the result of self-conscious efforts on the part of those who sustain them. Some of the arrangements derive, rather, from the aggregation of individual decisions that are designed to serve immediate subsystem concerns but that cumulate to system-wide orderly arrangements. The setting of prices in a market place exemplifies a self-regulating aggregation that facilitates order: sellers are concerned with receiving the highest possible amount for their goods and buyers seek to pay the lowest possible amount, but the result of their individual bargains is normally a stable and orderly system-wide market for the commodity. Similarly, individual members of Amnesty International work on specific cases of illegal

³ Rajhi Kothari, "On Human Governance," *Alternatives*, 12 (1987), p. 277.

imprisonment and torture, but the collective sum of their efforts makes a substantial contribution to that dimension of global order through which a modicum of human rights is preserved. Or consider the example of the flight of East Germans to the West in the fall of 1989: as participants in the Cold War order they previously acquiesced in the prohibition against movement across the East-West border, but that consensus unraveled with the decision of each family to flee to West Germany and, within only weeks, the cumulative impact of these decisions hastened an end to that system of governance and initiated a new one that is still very much in the process of formation.

On the other hand, some of the arrangements underlying a global order spring from activities that are self-consciously designed to maintain the order. Most markets have created rules and officials charged with monitoring and preventing unfair practices; Amnesty International has an executive committee that assigns cases to individuals and issues periodic reports on overall patterns in the human rights field; during the Cold War East Germany had officials and laws that relied on police powers to insure the continuance of the consensus that kept East Germans from emigrating, just as the subsequent breakdown of that consensus was facilitated by West German, Hungarian, and other authorities who sought to encourage the emergence of a new order. And it is here, in those dimensions of order suffused with intentionality, that its close links to governance are most readily discernible.

While examples help to clarify the concept of governance and how it is more encompassing than that of government, they obviously do not guarantee the resolution of conceptual ambiguity. The distinction between governance and government and the links between governance and order are not self-evident. In some languages (German for one), in fact, there is no readily identifiable word that signifies governance. The notion of intersubjective systems of rule not backed by legal and constitutional authority is too improbable an aspect of political processes in the cultures that employ these languages to have allowed for convergence around a simplified, single-word designation of the concept. But even those whose language includes such a designation can easily encounter difficulty in using the concept. A host of diverse (but not incompatible) nuances attach to the use of "governance" in English. As indicated above, some formulations conceive of governance in functional terms, that is, in terms of the tasks that have to be performed to sustain the routinized arrangements of the prevailing order and that may or may not be performed by governments. For other observers governance is linked to the capacity to regulate the

arrangements so that they remain routinized. For still others governance is associated with occasions when power is exercised independently of the authority of government. Some distinguish governance as a mode of allocating values while viewing government as operating the mechanisms through which the allocation is accomplished. In some instances governance is equated with the emergence of rule-like systems and problem-solving devices.⁴

Notwithstanding the various shades of meaning attached to the concept, there is one dimension of governance about which all of the ensuing chapters fully agree. It is that while a focus on "governance without government" does not require the exclusion of national or sub-national governments from the analysis, it does necessitate inquiry that presumes the absence of some overarching governmental authority at the international level. Put differently, the concept of governance without government is especially conducive to the study of world politics inasmuch as centralized authority is conspicuously absent from this domain of human affairs even though it is equally obvious that a modicum of order, of routinized arrangements, is normally present in the conduct of global life. Given an order that lacks a centralized authority with the capacity to enforce decisions on a global scale, it follows that a prime task of inquiry is that of probing the extent to which the functions normally associated with governance are performed in world politics without the institutions of government.

Many students of world politics are inclined to use the term "anarchy" to designate the absence of a centralized authority in world politics. For them anarchy has neither good nor bad connotations. Nor does it necessarily imply that the prevailing global order is marked by pervasive disarray and commotion. Rather, "anarchy" is employed simply as a descriptive term for the lack of a centralized authority that stands over national governments and has the capacity, including the use of force if necessary, to direct their conduct. For some analysts, however, anarchy implies a lack of patterned rule, a tendency for actors to go their own separate ways without regard for common principles, norms, rules, and procedures. Such an implication seems highly questionable. As one observer puts it, noting the authority that attached

⁴ For an inquiry that identifies sixteen different types of situations in which governance operates as a system of rule, see James N. Rosenau, "Governance without Government: Systems of Rule in World Politics" (Los Angeles: Institute for Transnational Studies, University of Southern California, November 1987). An extended critique of this essay is developed in Richard K. Ashley, "Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), ch. 13.

to many treaties, international legal precedents, and international organizations, "the international system (in spite of its lack of an overarching regime or world government) is several steps beyond anarchy."⁵

In sum, governance and order are clearly interactive phenomena. As intentional activities designed to regularize the arrangements which sustain world affairs, governance obviously shapes the nature of the prevailing global order. It could not do so, however, if the patterns constituting the order did not facilitate governance. Thus order is both a precondition and a consequence of government. Neither comes first and each helps explain the other. There can be no governance without order and there can be no order without governance (unless periods of disorder are regarded as forms of order).

GOVERNANCE, REGIMES, AND INSTITUTIONS

Some might wonder whether the foregoing delineation of governance is any different from the concept of international regimes that is presently very much in vogue in the study of world politics.⁶ Like governance, regimes are conceived as arrangements – "as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge"⁷ – for sustaining and regulating activities across national boundaries. Like governance, they encompass governmental and non-governmental actors who intersubjectively concur that cooperation on behalf of their shared interests justifies acceptance of the principles, norms, rules, and procedures that differentiate and give coherence to their regimes. In effect, therefore, since they operate in the absence of any central authorities, regimes can readily be described as forms of governance without government. Are they not, then, the equivalent of what has been identified here as the governance that is inherent in a global order? No, they are not. Despite the similarities between the two concepts, they are far from identical. The widely accepted definition of the characteristics of regimes quoted above has an added phrase which summarizes the prime difference: the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of any regime are defined as converging "in a given area of international relations,"⁸ or what has also been called an "issue-area." As used in this

⁵ Robert C. North, *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 136.

⁶ See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2. ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

volume, on the other hand, governance in a global order is not confined to a single sphere of endeavor. It refers to the arrangements that prevail in the lacunae between regimes and, perhaps more importantly, to the principles, norms, rules, and procedures that come into play when two or more regimes overlap, conflict, or otherwise require arrangements that facilitate accommodation among the competing interests. In the case of the Cold War, for example, governance involved according a greater priority to the arms control regime than to, say, issues involving the free movement of people, with the result that Soviet-American arms control negotiations, unlike those over trade matters, were never interrupted by questions pertaining to the emigration of Jews from the U.S.S.R.

Again, in short, the governance inherent in a global order is the more encompassing concept. As one regime theorist puts it, “International orders are broad framework arrangements governing the activities of all (or almost all) the members of international society over a wide range of specific issues,” whereas “international regimes, by contrast, are more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of international society. Thus, we speak of the international regimes for whaling, the conservation of polar bears, the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and human activities in Antarctica.”⁹

The author of this formulation posits the governance of international orders and regimes as different subcategories of international institutions. Such an additional conceptual layer, however, seems more optional than necessary. Institutions connote the presence of authoritative principles, norms, rules, and procedures, thereby running the risk of obscuring the informal, non-authoritative dimensions that are so essential to the functioning of international orders and regimes.

ANALYTIC ORDER VERSUS NORMATIVE ORDER

The dynamics of global transformations are especially conducive to clarifying the distinction between “order” as an analytic concept and “order” as a normative precept. For change fosters uncertainty, and the more dynamic the change processes, the more extensive the uncertainty as people become apprehensive over the loss of the pre-change stability and fearful that the change might result in institutions

⁹ Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 13.

and conditions less satisfying than those which prevailed earlier. Thus the transforming dynamics are bound to focus concern around the desirability of the emergent global arrangements vis-à-vis those they are replacing. That is, normative concerns are bound to intensify as questions about global order – about the fundamental arrangements for coping with conflicts and moving towards goals – surface in the political arena. But, clearly, there is a huge difference between empirically tracing the underlying arrangements and analyzing their potential consequences on the one hand and judging the pros and cons of the arrangements on the other. The empirically discerned order may cry out for judgment and the normative order may cry out for accurate description, and both intellectual exercises can be pervaded by difficulties as the line dividing them can be obscure and variable. Nevertheless, the line is important and international relations analysts need to be ever-mindful of when they cross it. To be insensitive to the distinctions between normative judgments and empirical observations is to run the risk of either clouding sound analysis with preferred outcomes or confounding preferred outcomes with empirically faulty recommendations. Perhaps no degree of sensitivity can prevent some confusion along these lines – as observation is in some respects a normative enterprise – but surely it is the case that confusion can be kept to a minimum if we relentlessly monitor our tendency to allow the wish to be the father of our thoughts or the empirical assertion to be the source of our judgments.¹⁰

The problem of differentiating between empirical and normative orders can be nicely illustrated by the question of whether global arrangements marked by a high degree of disorder are to be considered a form of order. If by an “empirical order” is meant the arrangements through which global affairs move through time, then obviously a vast array of diverse arrangements can qualify as forms of order. History records, for example, years of hegemonic order in which a single country dominated world politics, eras of power balances in which countries formed alliances to offset each other’s strengths, decades of bipolar rivalries in which two countries vie for world leadership, and periods of polyarchy in which many countries competed for global

¹⁰ A good case in point here is the World Order Models Project (WOMP), which is considered by some analysts to have transgressed the line between empirical and normative orders. While seeking to advance specific normative views of global order, it is argued, WOMP embeds the reasoning on behalf of order in a rationalist, scientific context that implies objectivity but that is heavily value-laden. For an indication of the WOMP approach, see the essays in Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

influence. Indeed, one observer has identified eight possible forms of order that may evolve in the future.¹¹

Whatever its particular form, any global order can be located on a continuum which differentiates between those founded on cooperation and cohesion at one extreme and those sustained by conflict and disarray – i.e., disorder – at the other. Viewed in this way, much of the twentieth century, its hot and cold wars and ideological competitions, can be treated as every bit an international order as the relatively stable and peaceful conditions that prevailed under the Concert of Europe during parts of the nineteenth century. In other words, it is possible to conceive of any moment of history as an international order, no matter how undesirable it may be.

But many analysts are uncomfortable with this formulation. They associate order with minimal degrees of stability and coherence, so that periods of international history marked by war, exploitation, and a host of other noxious practices are viewed as disorderly arrangements – as “chaos” or “entropy,” or anything but forms of order. For them, order has a positive, normative connotation even as they may concede that too much stability and coherence can be expressive of stagnant arrangements that allow for little or no progress.

The distinction between empirical and normative orders is also manifest whenever analysis focuses on policy questions, on promoting or preventing new global arrangements. Those who link forms of systemic order with policy goals necessarily work with images of normative orders. They may strive to recommend only actions founded on empirically sound assessments, but by turning from the assessments to recommendations they necessarily move into the realm of norms, of orders that are constructed or reinforced so as to enhance or thwart the establishment of specific values. To be concerned about the protection or advancement of human rights, for example, is to become enmeshed in problems of normative order as one focuses on the ways in which the prevailing global arrangements impact on individuals and how their freedom to speak, organize, and worship is or might be curtailed by the practices and institutions through which their lives are governed.

LAYERS OF EMPIRICAL ORDER

While the normative dimensions of global order are pervasive and unavoidable, it is nonetheless possible to tease out and separately analyse the empirical dimensions. By being mindful that observations

¹¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 248–56.

can subtly slip into judgments, one can describe activities and anticipate outcomes without recourse to approving or disapproving the former or applauding or regretting the latter. Or at least it is possible to be more rather than less successful at suspending or postponing judgment. Just as the normative theorist is ever ready to characterize the desirable and undesirable qualities inherent in an activity, outcome, or institution, so is the empirical theorist ever alert to what the activity, outcome, or institution encompasses or portends, irrespective of its desirability. Indeed, it can well be argued that the more normative evaluations and recommendations are rooted in sound empirical estimates, the more are they likely to be incisive and effective. For policy goals to be realizable as well as emotionally satisfying, that is, they must be minimally in touch with the empirical circumstances in which any efforts to implement them are undertaken. Appreciation of these circumstances is likely to elude actors who do not pause to distinguish between the empirical and normative orders they seek to understand and affect.

But this is not to imply that tracing and anticipating the empirical dimensions of global order are easily accomplished. Sorting the empirical from the normative is only the first of several important steps. Next is the equally difficult task of delineating empirical orders at several levels, of comprehending the extraordinary complexity of human affairs and peeling off the layers of order that sustain it. Quite aside from normative considerations, there is no coherent set of arrangements whereby global politics gets from one day to the next. Rather, the patterns that constitute the order of an international relationship, a geographic region, or all of world politics recur at diverse sites, at different rates, and in various forms. Each pattern shapes and is shaped by the others so that together they comprise an organic whole – an order that with varying degrees of success and failure copes with challenges, manages change, and endures until such time as its foundations are no longer consistent with the needs, wants, capacities, and practices of people.

It follows that the prevailing global order, whatever it may be in any period, consists of a more extensive diversity of sites, rates of change, and configurations of structure than any international order. Here the global order – also referred to as “world politics” – is conceived as all-encompassing, as embracing every region, country, international relationship, social movement, and private organization that engages in activities across national boundaries. The purposes and scope of these activities may be limited to particular issues, dyadic concerns, or regional controversies – indeed, few activities undertaken on the world

stage are intended to have worldwide consequences – but as such they are nonetheless a part of the prevailing global order. That is, the activities at the diverse sites may be quite unrelated to each other and their repercussions may not extend beyond the particular regions or relationships in which they occur; yet, they are an expression of the prevailing global order in the sense that the very narrowness of their scope is among the arrangements through which world politics gets from one moment in history to the next.

Stated in still another way, a central characteristic of the prevailing global order is the degree of connectedness or disconnectedness among the system's actors that marks its diverse arrangements. In earlier centuries, for example, transportation and communications technologies were such as to isolate various components of the global system from each other, with the result that the prevailing order was sustained by highly decentralized arrangements for moving through time. The European part of these earlier orders was, to be sure, dominant, but its dominance did not become global in scope until the middle of the nineteenth century.¹² Yet, what happened in other parts of the world prior to the opening of the Far East to Western ways in the mid-1800s was surely part of the global order even if the attention of politicians and historians focused mainly on Europe. As technology reduced geographic and social distances, the prevailing order can be said to have become progressively more centralized, with the repercussions of activities in one part of the world reaching ever more widely to other parts. Today, with transportational and communications technologies more dynamic than ever, with the problems of the Third World more salient than ever, and with the globalization of national economies more thoroughgoing than ever, the prevailing order probably involves more connectedness than it ever has before (even as it also continues to be the case that the arrangements which sustain the present order allow for disconnected activities that are localized in their scope and impact). Thus it is, for example, that the present global order includes an Islamic order as well as a Western order, two components that function side by side in an uneasy, distant, and friction-filled relationship which is as often marked by separate, unconnected activities as by coordinated efforts at accommodation.

In short, global order is conceived here to be a single set of arrangements even though these are not causally linked into a single coherent

¹² For a cogent discussion of the role of Europe in the global order of earlier centuries, see William H. McNeil, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

array of patterns. The organic whole that comprises the present or future global order is organic only in the sense that its diverse actors are all claimants upon the same earthbound resources and all of them must cope with the same environmental conditions, noxious and polluted as these may be.

The numerous patterns that sustain global order can be conceived as unfolding at three basic levels of activity: (1) at the ideational or intersubjective level of what people dimly sense, incisively perceive, or otherwise understand are the arrangements through which their affairs are handled; (2) at the behavioral or objective level of what people regularly and routinely do, often unknowingly, to maintain the prevailing global arrangements; and (3) at the aggregate or political level where governance occurs and rule-oriented institutions and regimes enact and implement the policies inherent in the ideational and behavioral patterns. The first involves the mental sets, belief systems, shared values, and any other attitudinal or perceptual screens through which the events of world politics pass before evoking reactions or inactions. As such, the ideational level is most manifest in the recurrent themes of speeches, editorials, books, and any other media through which those who participate in international relations give voice to their understanding of how the world is ordered. Except during transformative periods when uncertainty about the evolving structures of global order is high, the recurrent themes that are expressive of order at the ideational level tend to be widely shared among allies and adversaries alike, forming an intersubjective consensus that locks all concerned into the same premises about the nature of the underlying arrangements for the conduct of global affairs. From this perspective alone, the Cold War was nothing more than a set of globally accepted assumptions that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were caught up in a hostile, competitive, and ideological contest for influence and power.

The second level of activity that sustains any global order consists not of what actors think or perceive, but of what they do in a regular and patterned way to give behavioral expression to their ideational understandings. They threaten, negotiate, arm, concede, or otherwise engage in a whole range of recurrent behaviors that are so salient as to shape and reinforce the prevailing conceptions of the underlying global order.¹³ During the height of the Cold War, for example, repeated

¹³ For example, the World Event/Interaction Category System (WEIS), a content analytic scheme for creating events data bases, consists of 63 major types of action that states can undertake in world politics. An initial WEIS analysis of 5,550 events yielded an intriguing set of recurrent patterns depicting the extent of conflict and cooperation that prevailed on a global scale in 1966. Cf. Charles A. McClelland and Gary D.

demands by the superpowers that their allies support their policies became part and parcel of the existing order (even as subsequently a growing resistance to these demands were, in retrospect, clear signals that the order was beginning to come apart).

The third level of activity involves the more formal and organized dimension of the prevailing order. Those institutions and regimes that the diverse actors in the system fashion – such as Bretton Woods, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and the United Nations – as a means of pursuing their ideational and behavioral inclinations are obviously constituent elements that shape the arrangements through which global politics moves through time.

It should be stressed that, whatever may be the degree of orderliness that marks global affairs at any period in history, it is a product of activity at all three of these levels. This is plainly evident in the analysis of the Concert of Europe in Chapter 2, and it is perhaps even more manifest in the period of the Cold War: without officials and publics in both the East and West intersubjectively sharing the premise that both sides were locked in aggressive competition to prevail over the other, the Cold War could not have endured for more than four decades. Nor could it have persisted without the regularized behavior of officials and publics that articulated, intentionally or otherwise, the premise of aggressive competition. And, obviously, the competition could not have been sustained without the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, and the many other institutional arrangements that gave expression and direction to the ideational consensuses and the behavioral routines of people on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain (itself a symbol of the boundaries imposed by the prevailing order). Once the course of events began to undermine the premises and patterns at the ideational, behavioral, and institutional levels, however, the Cold War quickly unraveled, with developments at each level reinforcing change at the other two and thus hastening the end of the period and the start of a transition into the new, post-Cold War era of the present. Note again that activities at all three levels were necessary components of the transformation. Without a growing perception shared by East Europeans that their conduct could not be controlled by the Soviets, a termination of the Cold War could not have occurred. Nor could it have dwindled down without new behavior patterns whereby

Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions among Nations," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Free Press, rev. edn., 1969), pp. 711–24.

people demanded change by converging in city squares and atop the Berlin Wall (itself a symbol of the obsolescence of Cold War boundaries). Likewise, the advent of a post-Cold War order could not have occurred without the policy initiatives of the major powers and their alliance systems that facilitated the replacement of the rigid premises of aggressive competition with a less structured search for new power relationships.

For analysts who have occasion to probe deep into the origins of global order, this three-dimensional formulation might seem insufficient. It fails to distinguish between the sources and practices of empirical orders, they might argue, adding that it also does not specify whether a global order is the regularized activities of world politics or the outcomes of these activities. During the Cold War, they might ask, which patterns constituted the global order of that period? Was it the arms race, deterrence policies, the espionage networks, the competition for influence in the Third World, and the rhetoric of antithetical ideologies? Or was it the consequences of these activities – the Cuban missile crisis, the deadlocked Summit meetings, the closed borders, the ban against technological transfers, the wariness of hostile publics, etc.? Or was it the deep attitudinal structures of suspicion and hostility that led publics and elites alike to engage in such activities and foster such outcomes?

On the grounds that the diverse ideational sources, behavioral patterns, and political institutions of any global order are interactive – that each is a source, an activity, and an outcome relative to the other two – efforts to answer such questions need not be undertaken. It is enough to stress that each dimension is a necessary but not a sufficient determinant of the prevailing order. Only those concerned with narratively tracing its evolution and decline through time need to specify temporal sequences of causation. For those with analytic rather than narrative concerns, it suffices to focus on the interactive nature of ideational, behavioral, and institutional dynamics and to treat their temporal priority as simply a chicken-and-egg problem for which there is no clear-cut solution.

This avoidance of specific causal sequences, however, should not be interpreted as minimizing the strength of the multidirectional interactions among the three sets of dynamics. There can be no gainsaying, for example, the large degree to which inertia and transaction costs sustain an order long after material conditions change and exert pressure for ideational, behavioral, and institutional transformations. But once the dynamics of change so strongly challenge the ideational bases of the prevailing order as to result in altered attitudes and

orientations, the behavioral and institutional dimensions of that order will surely be weakened and eventually shattered. Contrariwise, if the behavioral and institutional bases of a new order are spurred into place despite the inertia of old habits, the ideational perspectives will be under strong pressure to fall into line accordingly. In short, world politics, no less than any other domain of human affairs, are marked by a strong tendency to fit beliefs to behavior, and vice versa, and thus it would be erroneous to equate an interactive perspective with the absence of powerful causal dynamics. It is precisely because the multi-directionality of the causal flows can be so strong that an interactive perspective seems preferable to attempting to locate them in temporal sequences.

Once again the Cold War is illustrative. At least with hindsight, one can readily discern how the patterned behavior of, say, the arms race facilitated the institutionalized practices of alliance systems and Summit meetings, how these institutional arrangements exerted pressure for intersubjective ideational consensuses, how the shared mental sets reflected in the consensuses influenced the arms race and stimulated institutionalized efforts at arms control, all of which further reinforced the systems of thought that distinguished the Cold War from its predecessor and successor as a form of global order. From an interactive perspective, in short, a global order is indivisible. It is both idea and practice, stimulus and outcome, premise and institution. Whatever contributes to the expected and regularized ways in which events happen – the tangling of adversaries, the bargaining of allies, the surfacing of issues, the waning of controversies – is a constituent part of the order that prevails in world politics during a recognizable period of history. Indeed, it is this order that makes the period recognizable.

Viewed as an interactive set of dynamics, moreover, any of the several dimensions of global order can serve as a point of entry for analysts interested in assessing the viability of a particular order. One may be especially concerned with the ideational soil in which an order flourishes, but it will not be long before such a focus leads one to test and exemplify the dominant ideas through the behaviour and institutions that give concrete expression to the order. To be sure, analysts are not precluded from specializing in one or another of the dimensions, but in so doing they will hardly be able to ignore the relevance of the other dimensions.

Viewing the ideational, behavioral, and institutional dimensions of global order as so interactive as to inhibit the tracing of causal sequences poses a noteworthy methodological problem. Such a

conception challenges the framing of hypotheses that systematically link independent and dependent variables. This scientific procedure deflects attention away from the interactive dynamics of global order by presuming that certain phenomena (the independent variables) are prior in time to those they systematically affect (the dependent variables). While such may be the case in a short-term context, it may not hold in a stretched-out time perspective that encompasses the interactive nature of the variables and that thus treats the new values for the dependent variables as systematic stimuli to changes in the original independent variables. In other words, the essential dynamics of any global order are, in effect, both independent and dependent variables in the endless processes whereby the patterns that constitute the order are maintained.

Three possible solutions to this problem are available. One is to confine analysis to limited short-term hypotheses that focus on linear rather than interactive relationships. Analysts can, for example, hypothesize about the impact of particular ideational premises on specific behavioral patterns, consigning to subsequent hypotheses the question of how the latter feed back and affect the former. A second solution is to focus empirically on critical situations, or "hard" cases, as a means of advancing theoretical perspectives. If hypothesized expectations survive the test of the "hard" case – the complex circumstance that encompasses so many variables as seemingly to defy testing – it becomes reasonable to conclude that other, more clear-cut cases will have also been explained. Several chapters in this volume use one or another form of the hard-case procedure to test the theoretical propositions they develop.

A third solution to the methodological problems of probing global orders, and one that may especially lend itself to the stretched-out perspective of some of the ensuing chapters, is that of eschewing the scientific procedure of designating independent and dependent variables, replacing it with a method that maintains a sensitivity to the interactive complexity of global order by relentlessly estimating how a shift in one set of dynamics may affect each of the other two sets and feed back as a stimulus to reinforcing or further shifting the original change. This procedure is, admittedly, ungainly and subject to grievous error (since the presumption of multiple causality may encourage unrestrained, hasty, and possibly faulty attributions of consequence), but the alternatives of avoiding causal inquiry or confining it to short-term sequences are surely even more inappropriate if comprehension of the nature of global order is to be enlarged.

ORDER AND CHANGE

If ideational, behavioral, and institutional patterns interactively sustain established global orders, what causes them to change? It is not enough simply to respond that alterations in these patterns give rise to corresponding transformations of the prevailing order. Not only is such an answer self-evident and tautological, but it also ignores the key question of what underlies changes in the ideational, behavioral, and institutional dynamics. To be sure, once an order is in place, these dynamics operate as sources in the sense that they interactively feed on each other to maintain the order. But, obviously, there are even deeper sources that either prevent the transformation of the dynamic patterns or foster their breakdown and the emergence of a new order.

Nor do questions about the links between change and order end with the identification of deeper sources that underlie the ideational, behavioral, and institutional patterns. One is also impelled to ask whether the change reflects a decay or a reconstitution of the old order? Whether the transformations are so fundamental as to lead to a new order or whether they are of only limited scope such that some dimensions of the older order remain intact? Does the emergence of a new global order constitute systemic change or change within the system? Is there a difference between changes in the behavioral patterns of actors and changes in the distribution of power among them? Is there likely to be a substantial time lag between changes in, say, the ideational dimension and those that occur at the behavioral and institutional levels? Can periods of intense and pervasive conflict persist across long stretches of time, or are the underpinnings of order bound to break down if the conflict becomes too intense and too pervasive? Is order a cyclical phenomenon such that periods of extensive conflict that foster disorder and chaos are merely transitional moments in history that are soon followed by the establishment of new, more orderly arrangements? Can new global orders be created through political will and imagination, or is their emergence more the result of dynamic technologies, altered socioeconomic conditions, and transformed psychological perspectives that lie beyond human control?

There are, of course, no final answers to such questions. Much depends on how order and change are conceptualized.¹⁴ The more the

¹⁴ For extensive efforts to conceptualize the concept of change, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); James N. Rosenau, "Global Transformations: Notes for a Workshop on Change in the International System," *Emerging Issues*, Occasional Paper No. 1 (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, November 1989); and John Gerard Ruggie,

nature of global order is elaborately specified in terms which encompass ideational, behavioral, and institutional phenomena, the greater is the likelihood that the delineation of a collapsed order and the emergence of a new one will be confined to those rare circumstances when the transformative dynamics are viewed as expressive of fundamental decay rather than limited reconstitution, as systemic changes rather than within-system changes, as occurring across long stretches of time rather than precipitously, as too complex to be subject to the political will of a single generation. Furthermore, however order and change may be defined, each transition from an old to a new order may result from a different mix of ideational, behavioral, and institutional dynamics as well as a different combination of underlying technological, socioeconomic, and psychological conditions. Every global order, in other words, flourishes or fails in a specific historical context that cannot be ignored and that even the most elaborate formulation of the order concept must take into account.

One way to develop tentative insights, if not answers, into the foregoing questions is to raise them in the context of the unfolding international scene: why did the postwar, Cold War order come to an end? Yes, the underlying premises of aggressive competition and ideological rivalry were revealed to be mental images rather than objective realities and, as such, they collapsed as quickly as it took for the Berlin Wall to be pulled apart and transgressed; but why did the collapse occur in 1989 rather than 1979, 1969, or 1959? Indeed, why did the Cold War not persist until 1999 or into the next century? Posed in another way, assuming the events of 1989 were only the final, most dramatic stage in a longer process of systemic collapse, when did the end of the Cold War begin? With the advent of Solidarity in Poland? With the election of Ronald Reagan? With the death of Leonid Brezhnev? With the mass production of VCRs and the orbiting of television satellites in space?

Phrasing the problem of the relationship between order and change in these terms calls attention to the crucial importance of material

"Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics*, 35 (January 1983), pp. 261-85. Compilations of essays on the subject can be found in Czempiel and Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*; Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); and Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones, eds., *Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

interests and conditions as exogenous sources of the life and death of global orders. As has been outlined elsewhere,¹⁵ there are a great variety of material conditions that can shape the rules through which governance without government is sustained and order thereby maintained. Contrariwise, a transformation of the material conditions can foster a breakdown, or at least a restructuring, of the prevailing order. If, for example, an order is ensconced in widening economic discrepancies among its actors, the pressures for change and a new order are likely to be extensive and unremitting. Similarly, if the distribution of resources among an order's key actors should, for any one of a number of reasons, undergo substantial alteration, then corresponding changes in the prevailing hierarchical arrangements are likely to occur so that they remain consistent with the order's material underpinnings. To a large extent this is what happened when the Cold War came to an end. While the advent of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations doubtless contributed to the end of that order, perhaps even more fundamental was the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy and the widespread realization in the communist world that the premises of its ideology were profoundly flawed. Events culminated in 1989 rather than in earlier decades because it took that long for the disparity between the tenets of the ideology and the reality of the standard of living to become undeniable. One of the prime changes, in other words, involved the material conditions on which one party to the Cold War based its competition. The protests of Polish workers and the westward flight of East Germans of diverse occupations were in part responses to prolonged political repression, but no less central to their actions was a culmination of despair over their economic plight and the loss of hope that it could improve.

Another material condition that underwent a transformation undermining of the ideational, behavioral, and institutional foundations of the Cold War order involved the analytic competence of individuals on both sides of the ideological divide. Aided by expanding educational opportunities and the proliferation of VCRs, global television, computers, and many other products of the microelectronic revolution, citizens everywhere became increasingly adept at explicating scenarios of the macroeconomic, social, and political circumstances in which their lives were located. Accordingly, they became more aware of how, when, and where they could contribute to the aggregation of demands

¹⁵ Cf. Rosenau, "Governance without Government."

that served their interests.¹⁶ Thus it was not sheer coincidence that the Cold War order came to an end in the public squares of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. That order had been founded, in part, on the ideational presumption that the masses accepted the necessity of aggressive superpower competition, that they would compliantly conduct themselves in accordance with the behavioral implications of this mental set, and that they would support, or at least not contest, the military, economic, and political institutions through which the Cold War was waged. The enlarged capacity of people to discern the growing inappropriateness of these arrangements in an ever more interdependent world thus altered one of the prime material conditions, the level of human skills, from which the postwar order derived much of its strength.

Still another exogenous interest that changed enough to hasten the decline of the Cold War order was the advent of public issues with which the existing arrangements were ill-designed to cope. As previously noted, the dynamics of polluted environments, currency crises, terrorist attacks, AIDS, and the drug trade post challenges that have transgressed the boundaries of national competition and superpower rivalry, that require cooperation rather than conflict for amelioration to occur, and that thereby heighten the need for new ideational, behavioral, and institutional patterns to supplement, if not to replace, those through which global order was maintained in the immediate decades after World War II. Viewed in this way, the 1986 accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant becomes a symbol of the beginning, possibly even the next-to-last stage, of the end of the Cold War.

SYSTEM CHANGE VERSUS WITHIN-SYSTEM CHANGE

Having delineated global order as the routinized arrangements through which world affairs are conducted, and having suggested how an order breaks down and gets replaced, the question remains of whether the emergent, successor order rests on new systemic foundations or whether it derives from the reconstitution of the existing system. The ensuing chapters shed considerable light on this issue, but it may be useful to anticipate these responses by outlining an answer to a prior question: on what grounds should the emergent order be treated

¹⁶ For a development of this thesis, see Chapter 10 below. Extensive data supporting the notion of a skill revolution among citizens can be found in James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), esp. ch. 13.

as either wholly original or as a reconstituted version of its predecessor? Put more specifically, should the end of the Cold War be viewed as systemic change toward a new order, or are these bases for treating this development as within-system change of the old order?

Much depends, of course, on how the characteristics of the global system are perceived and identified. If they are conceived in broad terms which stress the continuing competence and dominance of states and their anarchical system which accords them sovereignty and equality, then the end of the Cold War and the replacement of its super-power rivalry with a more dispersed, less militaristic competition among many states can be seen as merely a new form of the existing order. Rearranged relationships, altered hierarchies, and new patterns of interaction, to be sure, but still the same old state system with the same old arrangements for conducting and managing its affairs. The post-Cold War changes are surely profound and extensive, and their consequences are surely bound to be enormous for decades to come, but in this interpretation they are nonetheless only within-system changes.¹⁷ If, on the other hand, emphasis is placed on the diminished competence of states, the globalization of national economies, the fragmentation of societies into ethnic, religious, nationality, linguistic, and political subgroups, the advent of transnational issues that foster the creation of transnational authorities, and the greater readiness of citizenries to coalesce in public squares, then the end of the Cold War and the emergent arrangements for maintaining global life are likely to be viewed as the bases for a wholly new order. States are still active and important, to be sure, but their participation in the processes of world politics is nevertheless of a different, less dominating kind, thereby leading to the interpretation that fundamental systemic change has occurred.¹⁸

Is there clear-cut evidence indicating support for one of these perspectives and rejection of the other? No, not yet; or at least the matter still seems open-ended. Many of the present global arrangements appear too unsettled in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire to warrant one or the other perspective. To repeat, moreover, much depends on how the key concepts are defined, thus enabling

¹⁷ For an elaborate formulation that supports the permanence of the state system – summarized by “the conclusion that the territorial map [of a world of states] has been frozen into its present shape once and for all” (p. 67) – and that thus allows for only within-system change, see James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. ch. 4 (“Nationalism and the International Order”).

¹⁸ For an extensive presentation of this perspective, see Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, ch. 10.

different analysts to offer different interpretations as they accord greater or lesser weight to the post-Cold War competence of states, the strength of transnational issues, the power of sub-group dynamics, and the changing skills of citizens.

The fact that the evidence on the scope of the transformations currently at work in world politics remains murky highlights a central feature of the processes whereby a global order undergoes either systemic or within-system change: namely, that both kinds of change are so fundamental that neither unfolds rapidly. The last stages of an old order may transpire as quickly as it takes for the Berlin Wall and East European communist regimes to crumble, but the processes whereby new arrangements come into being and fall into place are much more halting and cumbersome. Why? Because to some large extent the ideational, behavioral, and institutional foundations of an order are rooted in habits – in standardized, routinized, and repetitive ways of responding to events – and habits are not readily replaced. They can come apart rapidly when confronted with unmistakable indications of their disutility, but piecing together new routines and attitudes appropriate to the new, unfamiliar circumstances is quite a different matter. It takes time for confidence in the changes to develop, for sorting out the opportunities and dangers inherent in the changes, for a repertoire of diverse responses to evolve, and, indeed, for predispositions and actions to be repeated enough to be patterned.

If it is the case, moreover, that the prevailing order of world politics is a “human contrivance” (to borrow a phrase that has been used to characterize the Concert of Europe), and if its intersubjective foundations must today be global in scope, then the pace at which a new or reconstituted order emerges is bound to be slow. The Concert of Europe was contrived by just a few persons, whereas the presently emerging “contrivances” must extend across millions upon millions of people,¹⁹ some of which are likely to lag behind others in the quickness with which they come to share in the intersubjective bases of new global structures. Viewed as a process of habit and consensus formation, in short, a new or reconstituted global order may well take decades to mature.

¹⁹ Early in the 1990 controversy over the unification of Germany, for example, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed that the matter be decided by a referendum in which all the peoples of Europe, East and West, would vote. While the proposal never went any further, it is suggestive of the scale on which the new or reconstituted order may be fashioned.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

Each of the chapters that follow explores an important aspect of global order, change, and governance in the context of the foregoing considerations and mindful of the opportunities for insight offered by the dynamics of change presently at work in world politics. In Chapter 2, K. J. Holsti seeks to develop perspective on the current scene by probing the origins, operations, and consequences of the system of governance that prevailed among the great powers in nineteenth-century Europe. In a direct challenge to hegemonic stability theory, which argues that order in international relations is established and sustained by a single hegemon, Holsti demonstrates that “multipower stewardship” can flourish in world politics. His analysis shows how the shared experience of the Napoleonic drama provided a strong impetus among elites in Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary to avert the replay of a hegemonic war against France and avoid the liberal, populist revolutions and strife which further interstate warring would likely provoke. As a result, Holsti’s chapter highlights how the convergence of specified governing tasks, institutions, and decision-making rules, authoritative decisions, and coercive capacity gave rise to a system of governance that exerted a positive, independent causal effect on great power relations in the nineteenth century.

Mark W. Zacher uses historical comparison in Chapter 3 to construct an analysis of the “decay” of the “Westphalian temple,” by which he means the system of states that has conditioned the structure and functioning of world politics since the seventeenth century. Zacher argues that the growth of institutions, regimes, interdependence, and regulatory ventures constitutes compelling confirmation of emerging systems of governance in contemporary world politics. States are becoming increasingly enmeshed in a network of collaborative arrangements and regimes that are casting international politics in a very different mold from the one that has existed in recent centuries. As states increasingly demonstrate their willingness to trade autonomy off for other values, Zacher contends, assumptions about world politics that cling to the centrality of the sovereign state are becoming less and less credible.

In Chapter 4 Thomas J. Biersteker explores the study of governance in world politics by seeking to explain why a neoclassical convergence has recently emerged among underdeveloped countries. He focuses on the new and similar foreign and domestic policies through which Third World countries are participating in the international political economy as a basis for reflection on the relationships among different forms of

order in international relations (i.e., order as a system of ideas; order as behavioral convergence; or order as purposive governance), and as a means of clarifying the relative explanatory importance of factors lying at different levels of analysis. Biersteker's central proposition is that while behavioral convergence is likely to facilitate purposive governance in the international political economy, a degree of ideational convergence – often brought about by systemic shocks – tends to precede behavioral convergence in the causal chain. At the same time, in the final analysis, the triumph of neoclassical economics in the developing world is seen as the result of a complex interplay among levels and types of order in world politics.

Like Biersteker, Robert W. Cox is especially concerned with the ideational dimension of governance, what he regards as the “*intersubjective*” foundation of world politics. To probe this dimension, however, Cox looks to the past. In Chapter 5 he pursues his approach to governance without government by examining the writings of Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century Islamic philosopher, as a vehicle for delineating a framework for the deconstruction of the ontological constructs of the “*passing present*.” Cox's thesis is consistent with the other chapters in this volume in that one of its main goals is to shape an analytical framework which will allow an understanding of orders, institutions, and structures as transhistorical, phenomenological products that achieve a “*material*” status precisely because of their intersubjective pervasiveness. On the other hand, Cox's chapter deviates from the others in that it seeks to outline a non-positivist methodology for detecting change in world order. In so doing, the chapter provides a basis for action geared toward structural change in world politics, a practical knowledge to serve as a guide for political activity. What the Islamic philosophy of Khaldun contributes in this regard is the notion that analysts must become conscious of the conditioning of the historical period within which they operate, and at the same time pursue moral principles within the realm of the feasible.

The institutional dimensions of governance without government serve as the focus of Chapter 6, where Oran R. Young assesses the independent causal effect, or “*effectiveness*,” of international institutions in world politics. The theme of Young's chapter concerns the role of social institutions in shaping both the behavior of individual members of international society and the collective behavior resulting from their interactions. In what sense is the behavior of states responsive to the dictates of international institutions? Under what circumstances does their behavior contribute to the implementation of the implicit and explicit requirements of international regimes? According

to Young, an international institution is “effective” to the extent that its operations can be shown to impel actors to behave differently than they would have behaved in the absence of the institution or under the influence of a significantly different institution. This causal nexus is best established, Young argues, by looking at “hard cases” – those situations that are unfavorable to the operation of social institutions. He identifies several critical variables that go a long way toward explaining the relative effectiveness of institutions across a range of cases.

Janice E. Thomson assesses in Chapter 7 the usefulness of “state-building theory” – the general proposition that what does and does not get regulated at the international level is a function of the will of strong states – as a framework for understanding the emergence of international regulation. The state-building framework is tested through a comparative analysis of the nature of international regulatory ventures concerning such issues as terrorism, mercenarism, and the trade of alcohol, arms, and illicit drugs. Through this testing, the value of state-building theory is shown to be nebulous. It does not provide a definitive answer as to what does or does not get regulated at the international level or why. On the other hand, whereas the power of a state is not fully determinative of the emergence and nature of international regulation, Thomson shows that to some degree the powerful do generate the legitimacy and form international regulations will take. One might be inclined to view governance of this type as resulting from the gradual growth of Western practices, but it seems that norms in world politics stem more from the unintended consequences of a long history of state-building. In short, Thomson concludes that international regulation is a political rather than a moral phenomenon.

Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso explore in Chapter 8 contending approaches to governance without government by looking at the revival of tendencies toward European integration in the middle and late 1980s. The opportunities created by the “EC 1992” program, coupled with the uncertainty and complexity stemming from the upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, are seen to lend “particular urgency” to inquiries about governance in international relations. Cornett and Caporaso place integration in Europe within the discourse on international order by comparing the explanatory value of several contrasting theoretical perspectives: neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, functionalism, and neofunctionalism. While each perspective, they argue, offers a different explanation of the key dynamics behind the development of the European Community in the 1980s, only together do they capture the complexities and contradictions of governance systems in Europe. In their discussion of the

points of intersection and divergence among the diverse theories, they outline the foundations of a more sophisticated understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of competing views of governance without government.

Ernst-Otto Czempiel's essay (Chapter 9) is rooted in a liberal tradition that views global democratization as an overall positive basis for ideational, behavioral, and purposive convergence. Based on the proposition that liberal states do not tend to go to war with one another, Czempiel posits that the interactions of a global society consisting predominantly of states erected on the Western model will result in a peaceful system of governance. It is through this set of lenses that Czempiel analyzes the erosion of the Cold War order and offers projections and prescriptions for future orders in world politics.

Chapter 10 departs from the widely held assumption that global order and change are macro-level phenomena and explores the role of micro-level actors in the unfolding of governance without government. Can there be profound transformations in the nature of global governance, my chapter asks, without alterations in the orientations of citizens? Posed more directly, to what extent can we say that order and order transformations are the consequences of micro-level changes? These questions have both empirical and theoretical dimensions. At the empirical level, the chapter suggests the growth of interdependence and the "skill revolution" that has accompanied the microelectronic revolution have rendered citizens and their circumstances very different from earlier eras. At a theoretical level, it highlights how the increase in the intellectual and cathetic capabilities of individuals throughout the world has contributed to the transformations occurring at the global level. While the enhancement of micro skills are not seen as determining the exact nature and direction of macro order and change, it is argued that students of world politics need to recognize that people are adapting rather than remaining constant and that micro- and macro-level developments are thus interactive in the processes of governance without government.

Taken together, the chapters that follow affirm an observation made by Inis Claude to the effect that the world has less governance than most states, more than some, and probably less than it needs.²⁰ The contributors agree that systems of governance operate at the global level, that they can be founded on deeply entrenched beliefs, habits,

²⁰ I have been unable to find the exact quote, though memory tells me it is somewhere in Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York: Random House, 3rd edn., revised, 1964).

and institutions even as they are also ever susceptible to change, and that they can provide the bases for cooperation and collective benefits in world politics. Perhaps even more important, for a discipline that has long been rooted in the premise that governance is bounded by the prerogatives of sovereign powers, the chapters highlight the challenging proposition that there is much to be learned about the nature, scope, and limits of governance in a context where the actions of states, their sovereignties and their governments, are not preconditions of how events unfold.