NUS CIL
AI Manual Workshop

16 – 17 APRIL
Singapore

NUS National University of Singapore

CIL CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW National University of Singapore

The Lieber Institute for Law and Land Warfare Est 2016

Part 1:
About the Workshop

Recognizing that artificial intelligence (AI) has increasingly found its way onto modern battlefields, the Lieber Institute for Law and Warfare has launched a comprehensive research project aimed at providing a clear understanding of how international law applies to AI and AI-enabled military operations today. The culmination of the project, led by **Professor Michael Schmitt** and **Professor Sean Watts** with **Dr Klaudia Klonowska** as its Managing Director, will be the publication of the *West Point Manual on International Law Applicable to Artificial Intelligence in Warfare*. As States continue to integrate AI into their military strategies, the Manual will provide commanders, legal advisors, and other relevant stakeholders with a reliable practitioners' guide informed by real-world military legal experience to help them navigate the complex legal frameworks governing the development, fielding, and use of the technology on the battlefield. Currently projected to extend into 2027, the project will involve collaboration with global experts and consultations with State representatives to ensure the Manual's relevance and utility to its intended end users.

Recent developments in armed conflict have demonstrated that artificial intelligence is no longer peripheral to military operations. Instead, it is increasingly embedded within targeting cycles, intelligence fusion, and command decision-making processes. The compression of time between observation and action—once measured in days or hours — is now occurring at speeds that challenge traditional legal frameworks built on deliberation, attribution, and human judgment.

Against this backdrop, the Centre for International Law (CIL) at the National University of Singapore convened a two-day workshop on 16–17 April 2026 in Singapore to contribute to the development of the West Point Manual on International Law Applicable to Artificial Intelligence in Warfare. The workshop was a timely engagement with the evolving character of warfare and brought together experts from across academia, government, military practice, and the private sector.

The AI Manual Workshop participants, 16 April 2026.

Part 2:

Manual Purpose and Methodology

The workshop reaffirmed that the Manual would adopt an orthodox approach to international law, grounded in the sources identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. At the same time, there was a clear recognition that the application of these sources to AI-enabled warfare requires careful and context-sensitive analysis.

Participants consistently returned to a central tension: whether existing legal frameworks are sufficient to regulate AI-enabled operations, or whether the scale, speed, and autonomy of such systems expose gaps that require clarification, reinterpretation, or supplementation. The Manual's purpose, as reinforced throughout the workshop, is not to create new law, but to clarify how existing law operates under these emerging conditions.

Part 3:

Day One Proceedings

a) Welcome Remarks

The workshop opened with remarks from Dr Samuel White and Professor Sean Watts, setting a tone that balanced doctrinal rigour with operational urgency. Their framing emphasised that the Manual must remain anchored in law, while also being responsive to the realities of contemporary and future conflict.

Dr Samuel White, Global Fellow of CIL, highlighting how major transformations in warfare have historically been driven by advances in technology and noted that artificial intelligence (AI) has now moved beyond theoretical discussion into active operational use. Referring to recent conflicts, he emphasised the growing role of AI in accelerating military targeting processes through the integration of drone feeds, satellite imagery, signals intelligence and telecommunications data. He also noted that existing examples of AI-enabled military systems demonstrate that AI is already shaping modern warfare and raising urgent legal and ethical questions under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Dr White further stated that the workshop has brought together both early-career researchers and established scholars to explore areas where existing law may be insufficient or unclear in addressing emerging military applications of AI.

Afterwards, **Professor Sean Watts** outlined the objectives and development of the West Point manual project, describing it as a collaborative and comprehensive effort inspired by earlier Tallinn Manual projects on cyber operations. He explained that the initiative was motivated by the rapid proliferation of AI technologies in military operations and the growing recognition that technological developments are advancing faster than existing legal frameworks.

Professor Watts emphasised that the project seeks to capture a broad range of reasonable legal perspectives rather than promote a single position. He noted that the project adopts a highly collaborative process involving subject-matter experts, editorial review, adversarial "red team" assessment, and future consultation with international experts and states. It was also reaffirmed that the project does not seek to create international law, but rather to support states and legal practitioners in understanding how existing international law may apply to AI-enabled warfare.

Professor Watts then stressed that the success of the project depends on accurately understanding both the underlying technologies and the operational realities of modern warfare. Initially focused on lethal autonomous weapons systems, the project has expanded to address the wider range of AI-enabled military systems, which include AI decision-support tools. He also highlighted four key technical and legal challenges under examination, including human-machine interaction, data classification, system opacity and explainability, and vulnerabilities in AI systems.



Source*: Professor Sean Watt's presentation slides, p.12*

b) Panel One: Foundational Frameworks for AI, Data and Armed Conflict

Panel 1 was moderated by **Dr Jon Truby** and addressed foundational frameworks for AI, data, and armed conflict. **Professor Simon Chesterman** opened with a broad reflection on AI governance, situating military AI within wider regulatory debates. **Dr Jonathan Kwik** and **Mr Paul Lie** drew the discussion back toward legal classification, probing the extent to which existing categories can meaningfully capture AI-enabled systems. **Mr Gaurav Keerthi** added a practitioner perspective and highlighted how rapidly evolving technologies resist neat legal categorisation. Panel one concluded with strong consensus that AI and cyber operations are reshaping the structure of conflict itself. Participants emphasised the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers, engineers, policymakers, military personnel, academics, and private industry to address the rapidly evolving challenges posed by AI-enabled warfare and cyber conflict.

The first speaker, **Professor Simon Chesterman,** argued that AI governance cannot be separated from politics, as states and private technology companies often prioritise strategic and economic interests over strict regulation. Although the world is currently experiencing a "golden age" of AI governance discussions, with numerous frameworks, principles, and international initiatives emerging, he noted that these efforts frequently lack meaningful enforcement while AI capabilities continue to advance rapidly. He highlighted concerns over the growing influence of private corporations, the reduction of investment in AI safety, and the difficulty governments face in regulating technologies they do not directly control. Professor Chesterman stressed that the greatest risks do not come from autonomous machines themselves, but from the humans who design, deploy, and misuse them, especially in military contexts where opacity, bias, misinformation, and irresponsible decision-making can have severe consequences.

He further explained that AI presents unique regulatory challenges because of its speed, unpredictability, and lack of explainability, particularly in high-stakes sectors such as finance and warfare. While AI systems may avoid certain human weaknesses such as fatigue or emotional bias, Professor Chesterman maintained that humans must remain legally and morally accountable for lethal decisions under international law. He also warned that AI systems embed hidden cultural assumptions and biases through training data and algorithms, raising concerns about discrimination and cultural appropriation. Finally, he discussed the limitations of international governance, noting that states have conflicting priorities and little appetite for creating a strong global AI regulator. As a result, current governance efforts remain largely consultative, while the actors with the greatest influence over AI development often have the least incentive to accept restrictions.

Next, **Dr Jonathan Kwik** spoke both as a member of the drafting team for the AI manual and as part of the board of the Asia-Pacific Journal of International Humanitarian Law (APJIHL). Drawing from the submitted draft papers, Dr Jonathan Kwik focused on how AI challenges existing assumptions within international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly by forcing scholars and policymakers to rethink the entire lifecycle of military technologies. He argued that legal scrutiny can no longer focus only on the moment of deployment or attack, but must also examine earlier stages such as system design, training, testing, and adaptation. According to Dr Kwik, training data and system architecture heavily shape the behaviour and legality of AI systems long before they are operational. He also highlighted how modern legal systems are fundamentally anthropocentric, relying on assumptions of human intention, control, and accountability, while AI systems demonstrate forms of "agency" that do not fit neatly into traditional legal categories. Related concerns such as misalignment, where AI systems pursue goals differently from human intentions, and continuous system learning create further difficulties for oversight and explainability.

Dr Kwik also explored how AI blurs traditional boundaries within warfare and international law. Since many legally significant actions occur during pre-conflict stages such as development and testing, AI may require the integration and reinterpretation of multiple branches of IHL. He warned that training data itself could become a target for manipulation before hostilities begin, raising new legal issues surrounding cyber operations and preventative action. In the Asia-Pacific context, he highlighted the growing asymmetry between technologically advanced states and those lacking the capacity or willingness to adopt AI systems. While AI may strengthen powerful militaries, it could also empower weaker actors through unconventional asymmetric strategies. Dr Kwik concluded by expressing hope that ongoing academic and policy discussions would help develop proactive legal frameworks before AI technologies become deeply embedded in military practice.

Mr Paul Lie spoke in his personal capacity as a legal practitioner from Singapore's Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and offered an operational lawyer's perspective on AI, cyber operations and IHL. He argued that international humanitarian law (IHL) remains the primary legal framework for governing AI and cyber operations in armed

conflict, although applying existing legal principles to emerging technologies remains highly complex and unresolved. Speaking from an operational military legal perspective, he stressed that the challenge is not identifying the applicable law, but interpreting and applying it effectively in new domains such as cyber warfare and AI-enabled military systems. He rejected extreme portrayals of fully autonomous "killer AI," while also acknowledging that AI is already integrated into many military and legal functions, including research, drafting, and operational support. According to Mr Lie, policymakers must strike a practical balance between minimising humanitarian harm and recognising the inevitability of technological integration into defence operations.

Mr Lie also examined how cyberspace changes participation in armed conflict by lowering barriers for civilians and non-state actors to influence military operations, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Examples such as volunteer hackers or civilians sharing geotagged military information online demonstrate how individuals may inadvertently contribute to hostilities and potentially lose civilian protections under IHL. He further discussed attribution and due diligence issues in peacetime cyber operations, particularly where states may bear responsibility for cyber activities originating from their territory. Another major theme was the rise of "grey zone" operations, which involve coercive actions below the threshold of armed conflict and blur the distinction between wartime and peacetime legal regimes. Mr Lie concluded that while IHL continues to provide the foundational framework for regulating AI and cyber warfare, significant human expertise and judgement remain essential because AI is not yet capable of replacing military lawyers in interpreting and applying the law

The final speaker, **Mr Gaurav Keerthi**, approached the discussion from a practitioner's perspective, drawing on experience in AI development, cybersecurity, and military cyber operations. He explained cyber intrusions through a simplified lifecycle of reconnaissance, access, movement, and extraction, noting that most successful attacks still rely on basic vulnerabilities such as phishing, credential theft, and poor system configuration. He contrasted traditional deterministic software with modern AI systems, emphasising that AI operates probabilistically based on patterns learned from training data rather than fixed rules. As a result, AI outputs are less predictable and heavily shaped by the quality and biases of the data used to train them. He warned that AI systems trained on flawed security or military datasets may unintentionally reproduce distorted assumptions or unsafe operational behaviours.

Mr Keerthi also highlighted the operational and ethical challenges of deploying AI in cybersecurity and defence environments. Fragmented and sensitive data, combined with slow procurement and governance processes, often leave defenders lagging behind rapidly adapting attackers who can adopt AI tools more quickly. He discussed the rise of "citizen hacking" and warned that encouraging civilians or cybersecurity professionals to engage in offensive cyber actions during conflicts risks eroding long-standing ethical norms around authorization and responsible conduct. Additionally, he noted that unlike traditional defence, most cyber infrastructure is privately owned, creating a structural imbalance where private organisations bear major national security responsibilities without equivalent resources. He concluded by warning that AI dramatically accelerates decision-making timelines in security contexts, potentially reducing opportunities for meaningful human oversight and accountability as systems increasingly prioritise speed over deliberation.

c) Panel Two: Data as an Object of Warfare and Regulation

Panel 2, moderated by **Ms Danielle Yeow**, turned to the evolving role of data in modern warfare and whether data itself can qualify as an "object" under international humanitarian law (IHL).

Dr Thanapat Chatinakrob argued that contemporary warfare increasingly targets data-driven systems rather than solely physical infrastructure. While traditional interpretations of international humanitarian law (IHL) focus on tangible objects such as buildings or military equipment, cyber operations can now disable hospitals, energy grids, or financial systems through the disruption of data alone. He proposed a functional interpretation of the concept of "object," suggesting that data performing an operational role comparable to physical infrastructure should receive similar legal protection under IHL. Distinguishing between military, civilian, and dual-use data, he emphasized that civilian data should remain protected, while dual-use data presents significant legal challenges. Drawing on Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, he argued that existing legal frameworks are sufficiently adaptable to address data-centric warfare through an effects-based approach.

The second panellist, **Dr Samuel White,** expanded the discussion by examining "data poisoning," where maliciously altered datasets manipulate AI-enabled military systems during their development or training phases. Such interference could lead autonomous systems to misidentify targets or malfunction during operations. He highlighted the legal uncertainty surrounding peacetime data poisoning, noting that existing rules on sovereignty, intervention, and the use of force provide only partial guidance. Referring to the Martens Clause, he argued that the principles of humanity and public conscience remain relevant in regulating emerging military technologies, particularly concerns over fully autonomous weapons systems.

Mr Md. Mostafa Hosain addressed the broader regulatory and accountability challenges arising from AI-enabled warfare. Referring to recent examples of AI-assisted targeting and cyber operations, he emphasized that IHL continues to apply regardless of technological advancement, with civilian protection remaining its central objective. He supported an effects-based approach to cyber operations, arguing that harmful cyber activities should fall within IHL regulation even in the absence of physical destruction. Mr Hosain also discussed the complexities surrounding dual-use civilian infrastructure, which may become lawful military objectives under certain circumstances. Importantly, he stressed the need for a human-centered framework of accountability, maintaining that responsibility for AI-enabled military actions must ultimately rest with the human actors who design, authorize, or deploy such systems.

d) Panel Three: AI-integrated Weapons and the Crisis of Legal Responsibility and Accountability

The afternoon session shifted to one of the most contested areas. Moderated again by **Dr Jon Truby**, Panel 3 brought together Dr Mun-eon Park, Dr Anviksha Pachori, Dr Fan Yang, and Mr Drexx Laggui. The discussion moved quickly to the notion of a "responsibility gap", with participants questioning whether existing doctrines of command responsibility can adequately account for distributed, human-machine decision-making. While some emphasised continuity with existing legal principles, others pointed to the practical challenges of attribution in complex systems. The panel did not resolve these tensions, but it clearly identified them as central to the Manual's future work.

Dr Mun-eon Park analyzed criminal and command responsibility in the context of autonomous warfare. He explained that indirect or conditional intent may still establish liability where individuals foresee the possibility of unlawful harm yet proceed regardless. However, proving intent becomes significantly more difficult when autonomous systems independently influence operational decisions. Traditional doctrines of command responsibility also face challenges because they assume relationships between human superiors and subordinates, whereas autonomous systems are machines rather than legal persons. To address these accountability gaps, Dr Park proposed reforms including stronger domestic legislation, clearer standards for command responsibility, improved operational safeguards, and international agreements regulating autonomous weapons. He additionally suggested insurance schemes and victim compensation mechanisms as practical tools where direct criminal liability may be difficult to establish.

Dr Anviksha Pachori focused on the governance challenges posed by AI-integrated weapons systems, particularly within the context of India's increasing use of AI-enabled drone swarms despite limited regulatory frameworks. She argued that existing international humanitarian law (IHL) principles such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution remain relevant but are increasingly strained by autonomous technologies capable of evolving decision-making. Her presentation highlighted problems such as foreseeability, fragmented accountability, and the "civilianization" of armed conflict, where private contractors and civilian technological infrastructure become deeply integrated into warfare. She also criticized the limitations of Article 36 weapons reviews, noting that autonomous systems continue evolving after deployment, making traditional review mechanisms insufficient. Referring to the "AI misalignment problem," she explained that autonomous systems may produce unintended harmful outcomes despite operating according to their programming, thereby blurring the line between machine autonomy and human intent. In response, she proposed the concept of "IHL by Design," advocating for humanitarian law principles to be embedded directly into the design, development, and deployment of AI systems through explainability measures, continuous review, and built-in safeguards.

Dr Fan Yang and **Mr Drexx Laggui** concluded the session by addressing the broader issue of agency and accountability in autonomous warfare. Dr Yang argued that autonomous systems possess a form of operational agency because they independently process information and generate consequences with minimal human intervention. Using the idea of "agency below engagement," he demonstrated how autonomous systems may produce outcomes never specifically intended or authorized by humans, thereby exposing weaknesses in traditional legal frameworks built around human decision-makers. He proposed viewing autonomous operations through a "human-machine hybrid agency" model, where responsibility is assessed collectively across humans and machines rather than separately.

Mr Laggui reinforced this perspective through a fictional case study involving an autonomous weapon system mistakenly killing civilians within milliseconds due to algorithmic error. He argued that accountability can still be traced through procurement, deployment, technical testing, and command decisions, even where humans cannot meaningfully review machine-speed targeting decisions in real time. He emphasized that investigations should examine training data, system alignment processes, operational logs, and override mechanisms. Ultimately, he concluded that legal responsibility must always remain with humans because they design, approve, deploy, and oversee autonomous systems, even when machines perform the immediate operational functions.



Part 4:
Day Two Proceedings

a) Panel Four: Treaty Design and Regulatory Debates on Military AI

Day Two began with Panel 4 on treaty design and regulatory debates and was moderated by **Dr Jon Truby**.

Professor Zhixiong Huang argued that a new legally binding international treaty on military AI is necessary because existing international law is insufficient to address issues such as moral responsibility, accountability gaps, and compliance challenges. He highlighted concerns over autonomous systems making targeting decisions, difficulties in assigning legal liability when AI causes unlawful harm, and the lack of legal certainty under current frameworks. While noting broad international support for regulating military AI, he stressed that divisions among states, especially major military powers, make achieving a treaty politically difficult.

Dr Sze Hong Lam (Ocean) discussed the concept of "treaty-following AI," where AI systems are aligned with international treaties rather than abstract ethics or morality. Drawing on legal theory and international humanitarian law, he examined whether AI could reliably interpret and follow treaty rules during armed conflict. He concluded that while the idea may work in areas with clear and stable legal rules, the law of armed conflict contains deep ambiguities, competing interpretations, and strategic uncertainties that make fully encoding legal compliance into AI highly challenging.

The final speaker, **Ms Mei Ching Liu**, focused on debates within the UN Group of Governmental Experts on whether autonomous weapon systems should be defined as "lethal" autonomous weapons systems. She explained that some states support including the term "lethal" to narrow regulation to deadly systems, while others oppose it because lethality is an effect of use rather than a defining feature. Her analysis showed that the debate has remained unresolved for over a decade and warned that focusing too heavily on lethality could distract from the broader issue of autonomy.

b) Panel Five: Deception and Harm in AI-enabled Warfare

Panel 5, moderated by **Dr Samuel White**, examined deception and harm in AI-enabled warfare. Ms Dora Velenczei's analysis of perfidy in autonomous systems raised difficult questions about intent and deception in machine-led operations. Mr Vicko Taniady expanded the concept of harm beyond physical injury, prompting discussion on psychological, informational, and systemic effects. This panel was notable for its attempt to stretch traditional legal concepts to accommodate emerging realities.

Ms Dora Velenczei focused on the risk of AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems independently developing deceptive battlefield tactics that resemble perfidy, such as misusing surrender signals, medical symbols, or protected markers to gain military advantage. The speaker explained how reinforcement learning systems optimise outcomes through experimentation, potentially discovering unlawful behaviours without explicit programming. Three levels of AI architectures were discussed, ranging from low-risk supervised systems to advanced open-ended reinforcement learning systems capable of emergent deception. To address these risks, the speaker proposed a four-step "perfidy review framework" involving assessment of signalling capacities, incentive structures, red-team testing, and mandatory human oversight for interactions involving protected status signals. The presentation emphasised that existing IHL principles on distinction and proportionality are insufficient to detect these forms of AI-driven deception and argued for early regulatory intervention before such capabilities become operational realities.

The second speaker, **Mr Vicko Taniady**, examined how AI-driven and cognitive operations challenge the traditional legal understanding of harm in armed conflict. The presentation argued that current IHL frameworks remain heavily focused on physical violence, bodily injury, and destruction of objects, leaving psychological trauma, manipulation of information ecosystems, and social destabilisation inadequately regulated. The speaker highlighted how AI-enabled cyber and information operations can inflict severe mental suffering, including clinical trauma and widespread panic, without triggering the legal definition of an "attack" under existing law. Drawing on international legal instruments and jurisprudence, the speaker argued that mental suffering should be recognised as legally significant harm equivalent to physical injury. The presentation called for a broader interpretation of civilian protection that incorporates cognitive, psychological, and data-related harms into proportionality assessments. Concluding remarks stressed that international humanitarian law must evolve beyond traditional "blood and fire" metrics to preserve human dignity and meaningful civilian protections in the era of algorithmic warfare.

c) Panel Six: Regional Military Practice and Strategic Implications

The final panel, moderated by **Ms Danielle Yeow**, brought a regional perspective to the discussion and contributions from Dr Arlina Permanasari, Mr Erick Nielson Javier, Colonel Bagus Jatmiko, and Mr Pisal Chanty highlighted the diversity of approaches across Southeast Asia. Participants emphasised the importance of incorporating regional State practice into the Manual to ensure its relevance and legitimacy.

Dr Arlina Permanasari discussed Indonesia's evolving regulatory framework for artificial intelligence in relation to defence and military applications. She explained that Indonesia currently does not have a standalone AI law, but instead relies on a collection of existing regulations, including laws on electronic information, electronic transactions, and personal data protection, which together form the legal foundation for AI governance. She highlighted Indonesia's National Ethical Guidelines for AI, which, although non-binding, establish key principles such as inclusivity, humanity, transparency, accountability, security, sustainability, and respect for intellectual property rights. The speaker emphasised that AI governance in Indonesia is still at an early "norm-setting" stage, with regulations scattered across different sectors rather than consolidated into a comprehensive framework. In the defence sector, recent legal developments involving Indonesia's armed forces and cyber capabilities indicate growing recognition of AI's strategic importance, particularly in cyber operations. However, she stressed that legal responsibility and accountability still ultimately rest with human actors, even as AI systems become more integrated into military and public-sector activities.

Mr Erick Nielson Javier examined the growing interest of Southeast Asian militaries in AI and the reasons driving regional adoption of AI technologies in defence. He highlighted that countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines are increasingly exploring AI for military applications ranging from autonomous systems and surveillance to logistics, disaster response, and cybersecurity. At the ASEAN level, AI discussions have expanded significantly through defence and cybersecurity cooperation platforms, though much of the focus remains on non-combat applications and cyber governance rather than autonomous weapons. The speaker explained that Southeast Asian states view AI as both a strategic necessity and a means of avoiding technological marginalisation in an increasingly competitive global environment. At the same time, he noted concerns regarding cybersecurity, data sovereignty, and the risks of AI misuse by both state and non-state actors. He concluded by arguing that ASEAN should strengthen regional cooperation through common standards, greater military training on international humanitarian law, more realistic defence exercises involving AI scenarios, and potentially a more coordinated ASEAN position on international discussions surrounding autonomous weapons systems and AI governance.

Colonel Bagus Jatmiko focused on the risks posed by AI-enabled military systems and the challenges they create for IHL particularly from a Southeast Asian perspective. He argued that while AI promises faster decision-making, enhanced targeting, and improved operational efficiency, these benefits are accompanied by

serious structural risks such as algorithmic bias, opacity, accountability gaps, and value misalignment. According to the speaker, these flaws directly threaten core IHL principles including distinction, proportionality, and precaution. He warned that AI systems trained on foreign or culturally narrow datasets may misidentify civilian objects, ships, or populations in highly complex and diverse Southeast Asian environments, especially in regions such as the South China Sea or Indonesia's maritime zones. The speaker stressed that Southeast Asian states are particularly vulnerable because many are AI consumers rather than developers, lacking the technical capability to fully audit or govern imported AI systems. He called for ASEAN to become a proactive "norm entrepreneur" by developing regional AI governance mechanisms, binding legal frameworks, technical standards, and region-specific AI testing systems that account for Southeast Asia's unique geography, demographics, and security conditions.

Mr Pisal Chanty concentrated on the role of AI systems that support military decision-making before force is used, arguing that the greatest legal and ethical risks often arise prior to combat itself. Rather than focusing only on autonomous weapons, he examined AI systems involved in intelligence analysis, target verification, threat assessment, operational planning, and escalation management. He argued that existing international humanitarian law already provides sufficient legal foundations to regulate such systems, particularly through obligations relating to precaution, distinction, proportionality, and weapons review under Article 36. However, he identified several major problems with AI-assisted systems, including black-box opacity, data bias, automation bias, compressed decision-making timelines, and contextual failures in diverse operational environments. Using the Cambodia–Thailand border situation as a stress-test example, he demonstrated how AI systems could misinterpret civilian or military movements and potentially destabilise fragile ceasefires. He proposed a layered governance framework involving technical validation, human oversight, auditability, contextual testing, and operational restrictions in highly civilian-populated or unstable environments. He concluded that ASEAN has an important opportunity to develop regional AI governance guidelines and standards that ensure AI systems remain human-centred, accountable, and consistent with civilian protection obligations under IHL.

Part 4:

Conclusion and Future Progress

The workshop concluded with a synthesis session led by **Dr Samuel White**. Drawing together themes from across the panels, the discussion identified key areas of convergence, including the centrality of accountability, the growing importance of data, and the challenges posed by speed and scale. At the same time, significant areas of uncertainty were acknowledged, reinforcing the need for continued collaborative work.

The workshop marked a significant step in grappling with the legal implications of artificial intelligence as it moves from theoretical concern to operational reality.

Anticipated Outcomes

1. Select papers will be published in a Special Issue of Asia Pacific Journal of International Humanitarian law (APJIHL) in July 2026 and amplified through a symposium on West Point's *Articles of War.*
2. Proposed NUS 2026 Declaration on AI and International Law
3. West Point Manual on International Law Applicable to Artificial Intelligence in Warfare (2028)