Another Nail in the Coffin of Multilateralism?
Deep Sea Minerals Corp.’ Application Outside the ISA Framework
By Nicolò Andreotti
Published on 8 April 2026
The governance of deep-sea mining has long been anchored in a single foundational premise: activities in the Area must be conducted ‘for the benefit of humankind as a whole’ under the authority of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). This multilateral framework, established by Part XI of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1994 Implementing Agreement, was designed to prevent unilateral exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed and to ensure that no State or private actor could operate outside a collectively agreed system.
Recent developments, however, suggest not merely pressure on this premise, but the emergence of a structurally distinct challenge. The latest application submitted to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) by Deep Sea Minerals Corp. for an exploration licence under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA) does not simply seek to accelerate or influence ISA processes. Rather, it is situated entirely outside the UNCLOS framework and lacks any legal nexus to the ISA system. In doing so, it raises more fundamental questions about the continuing authority of the ISA and the resilience of the common heritage regime.
This post argues that the new NOAA application should be understood as part of a broader pattern of attempts to operate outside or place pressure on the ISA, but that it also represents a qualitatively different—and more destabilising—challenge to the multilateral governance of the deep seabed.
Setting the Stage: A Pattern of Operating Beyond the ISA
The most prominent recent attempt to test the limits of the ISA system came from The Metals Company (TMC). Through its subsidiaries Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI) and Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML), TMC holds two ISA exploration contracts sponsored by Nauru and Tonga. In 2021, Nauru triggered the so-called ‘two-year rule’, obliging the ISA Council to consider exploitation regulations within two years. The move was widely interpreted as an effort to accelerate the adoption of the Mining Code and to place pressure on the ISA to enable commercial extraction.
After the deadline passed—and after the Council agreed that no exploitation should begin without rules—TMC adopted a dual posture. On the one hand, it continued to operate within the ISA framework, using its contractual position to push for regulatory clarity. On the other, it established a U.S.-based affiliate, The Metals Company USA, LLC (TMC USA), which applied for exploration licences and a commercial recovery permit under U.S. domestic law.
The legal basis for this application lies in the DSHMRA, enacted in 1980 to provide a national licensing framework pending the development of an international regime. The Act authorises NOAA to issue exploration licences and commercial recovery permits, thereby creating a domestic regulatory system independent of the ISA. Although the statute remained largely dormant after UNCLOS entered into force, it was revived following an April 2025 Executive Order directing federal agencies to accelerate the assessment and approval of seabed mining activities.
This revival has reignited debate over the compatibility of unilateral seabed mining authorisations with the UNCLOS regime—particularly in light of Article 137(1), which prohibits the appropriation of the Area, and Article 153, which channels activities in the Area through the ISA (see e.g., here). While positions diverge, the legal tension is clear: national licensing frameworks risk operating in parallel to, rather than within, the Part XI system—a possibility that is now moving from abstraction to practice.
From Uncertainty to Opportunity
On 9 March 2026, TMC announced that NOAA had determined that the consolidated application submitted by TMC USA was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the DSHMRA and its implementing regulations. This development is significant not only in its own right, but also for what it signals: U.S. authorities are prepared to operationalise a domestic licensing pathway for seabed mining activities.
At the same time, the ISA continued its negotiations on exploitation rules. Yet the recently concluded first part of the ISA Council’s 31st session once again ended without agreement on the long-awaited exploitation regulations. Despite intensive discussions, delegations remained divided on core issues, including environmental thresholds, compliance mechanisms, benefit-sharing arrangements, and the responsibilities of sponsoring States. In the absence of consensus, the Council postponed key decisions and deferred further negotiations.
Taken in isolation, the Council’s continued difficulty in adoptingexploitation regulations reflects familiar structural and political constraints within the ISA. What is different in the present context is how this regulatory uncertainty interacts with parallel developments outside the multilateral system.
The combination of two dynamics—the acceleration of domestic licensing under the DSHMRA and the continued absence of agreed ISA exploitation rules—creates a window of strategic opportunity that may encourage private actors to advance projects on alternative regulatory bases. Crucially, this is not because the ISA’s deadlock legitimises unilateral action, but because it may be perceived as confirming that commercial timelines need not be tied to the pace of multilateral rulemaking.
It is against this combined backdrop that the latest NOAA application must be understood. On 23 March 2026, Deep Sea Minerals Corp. announced that it had submitted an application pursuant to the DSHMRA through its U.S. subsidiary, American Ocean Minerals Corp., seeking an exploration licence for polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. This development points to the emergence of an alternative regulatory pathway that is already being operationalised in practice.
A Qualitatively Different Challenge
Unlike earlier attempts to pressure or leverage the ISA system, the new U.S.-based applications represent a structurally distinct challenge. Three features are particularly significant.
First, unlike TMC—which continues to operate in parallel within the multilateral framework—the new application originates entirely outside it. Deep Sea Minerals Corp. holds no ISA exploration contract. It therefore has no sponsoring State under UNCLOS, no contractual obligations toward the ISA, and no duties to comply with ISA environmental or reporting requirements. This removes one of the primary sources of leverage the ISA possessed in the TMC case: the ability to suspend, sanction, or decline to renew a contract (as argued, e.g., here and here). In the absence of any contractual relationship, the Authority is effectively sidelined.
Second, the sponsoring State mechanism—central to the Part XI compliance architecture—is absent. In the TMC context, the ISA retains at least a theoretical avenue to scrutinise the conduct of sponsoring States (as argued here). Nauru and Tonga may be required to demonstrate that they have discharged their due diligence obligations, as articulated by the Seabed Disputes Chamber in its 2011 Advisory Opinion (para. 110), including exercising effective control over contractors and preventing regulatory circumvention. This framework creates a legal link between private actors and the international regime. By contrast, Deep Sea Minerals Corp. operates without any sponsoring State. The functional nexus that underpins the due diligence regime is therefore missing. The result is not merely regulatory avoidance, but the bypassing of a core compliance mechanism embedded in Part XI.
Third, the absence of a sponsoring State shifts the burden of enforcement onto UNCLOS States Parties. Articles 137, 138, and 139 UNCLOS articulate the collective character of the common heritage regime. Article 137 prohibits the recognition of claims or rights asserted outside the Part XI system, while Articles 138 and 139 impose obligations of conformity and due diligence, requiring States Parties to ensure that activities in the Area conducted by entities under their jurisdiction or control comply with the Convention.
As noted in this post, these provisions imply that States should take reasonable steps to ensure that corporations and nationals under their jurisdiction do not participate in, facilitate, or benefit from unilateral operations in the Area—for example by providing vessels, equipment, or technical services, or by dealing in minerals recovered outside the ISA framework.
In practice, however, enforcement through inter-State mechanisms remains unlikely. The political sensitivity of deep-sea mining, combined with emerging strategic interests, makes contentious proceedings improbable. Recent developments—including a U.S.–Japan memorandum on cooperation in deep seabed mining—suggest that at least some States may be moving toward alignment rather than opposition. This dynamic risks reintroducing an inter-State logic of competitive authorisation that the ISA was specifically designed to avoid.
Conclusion: A Governance Regime Under Strain
The new NOAA application marks a significant development in the evolution of the deep seabed mining regime. Unlike earlier efforts to accelerate or influence ISA processes from within, it reflects the emergence of activities with no legal or institutional connection to the UNCLOS framework.
The implications extend beyond the ISA as an institution. What is at stake is a broader shift in the structure of multilateralism governing the Area: from a centralised, treaty-based system toward a more fragmented landscape of parallel national and bilateral initiatives.
Whether this moment represents a temporary episode of strain or the beginning of a more durable transformation remains uncertain. Much will depend on how States Parties respond, both within and outside the ISA framework. What is clear, however, is that the assumption underpinning Part XI—that activities in the Area would be organised and conducted through a multilateral framework centred on the ISA—is becoming progressively harder to sustain in practice.
Nicolò Andreotti is a researcher in international law with expertise in ocean governance, deep seabed mining, and international investment and energy law. He holds a PhD in International Law (2026) from the University of Padua, Italy, and has conducted research at Leiden University, and the University of Dundee.