Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in EU FTAs: Adapting Enforcement Methods to the Purpose(s)?

by Stefanie Schacherer and Tensin Studer*

The EU has been negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. FTAs with Singapore, South Korea, and Viet Nam are already in force, and trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand are expected to be finalised in 2022. Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters (TSD Chapters) feature in all of these agreements. For the EU, TSD Chapters are currently the most important policy tool to balance trade openness with social and environmental objectives. There is high pressure on the EU from various stakeholders to get the balance right and to promote responsible trade and investment.

While much can be said about the issues surrounding the effectiveness of TSD Chapters, this Blog Post will focus on one aspect of them in particular, namely, their enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism of TSD Chapters, which adopt a relatively soft “collaborative” approach to ensure compliance with non-economic commitments, is subject to recurrent criticism and has become the dominant theme when assessing the benefits and effectiveness of TSD Chapters.

This Blog Post argues that neither the collaborative nor the sanctions-based approach to TSD enforcement are per se a TSD compliance panacea. We aim to demonstrate the underlying policy purposes of TSD Chapters and to argue that the enforcement method of TSD commitments should be assessed according to these purposes. Three EU TSD Chapter purposes are of particular relevance here: 1. Strengthening International Sustainability Standards, 2. Establishing a Level Playing Field, and 3. Mitigating Adverse Effects of the FTA Itself. In our opinion, more attention should be given to the question of what TSD Chapters actually seek to achieve prior to improving the enforcement mechanism.

  1. Key Features of TSD Chapter Enforcement

While each TSD Chapter in EU FTAs differs, the most commonly found substantive commitments of the EU and its trading partners are:

(1) to follow international labour and environment standards and agreements;
(2) to effectively enforce national environmental and labour laws;
(3) not to deviate from environmental or labour laws in an effort to encourage trade or investment, thereby preventing a “race to the bottom”;
(4) to sustainably trade natural resources, such as timber and fish;
(5) to combat illegal trade in threatened and endangered species of fauna and flora;
(6) to encourage trade and investment that supports tackling climate change; and
(7) to promote sustainability practices such as corporate social responsibility (CSR).

If a disagreement between the treaty parties occurs over the implementation of these TSD commitments, the parties first have to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution through inter-governmental consultations.[1] If no solution is found, the interested party can request to convene a Panel of Experts [2] composed of three panellists.[3] Through the panel process, the Panel of Experts first issues an interim report, allowing for comments by both sides. After considering the comments, the Panel of Experts then issues a final, publicly available, non-binding report including recommendations.[4] Importantly, if the Panel of Experts finds a breach of TSD Chapter commitments, no sanctions follow; instead, the TSD Chapters direct that the parties “shall discuss appropriate actions or measures to be implemented”[5] while taking into account the final report and recommendations of the Panel of Experts. The Committees on TSD, which oversee the general implementation of TSD Chapters, will then monitor the subsequent implementation of the final report by the party that has been found not to have conformed with its TSD obligations.[6]

In contrast to the EU’s collaborative approach stands the sanctions-based approach adopted by the United States in many of its FTAs. In particular, under US practice, FTA chapters on labour and environment foresee the possibility of inter-State arbitration as a last resort[7] following failed consultations and attempts to resolve the dispute by diplomatic means such as good offices, conciliation, or mediation.[8] Notably, the remedies available for the violations of the environmental or labour clauses of US FTAs are the same as those foreseen for other violations of the agreement, i.e., trade sanctions against the non-complying party.[9]

  1. The Debate on TSD Enforcement

The EU has been criticised for the relatively soft enforcement mechanism of its TSD Chapters, raising doubts about the EU’s seriousness in balancing its trade and investment policy with sustainable development. For many, there are no convincing reasons to exclude TSD commitments from the FTA’s general dispute settlement mechanism, which allows for arbitration or mediation, and which can lead to the suspension of trade concessions (i.e., sanctions). Hence, many scholars,[10] civil society groups, and Members of the European Parliament[11] have argued that TSD Chapters should allow for sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Those in favour of a sanction-based approach assume that compliance would be better guaranteed. Whether collaborative or sanction-based enforcement mechanisms are more beneficial for effective sustainable development integration is difficult to answer because there is not enough empirical evidence on their functioning and outcomes. There are, however, some arguments that warrant against a too simplistic assumption that sanctions would necessarily improve TSD compliance.

First, a sanction-based approach bears certain risks. On the one hand, sanctions can backfire leading to disadvantages (such as economic loss) for the sanctioning State itself, and on the other hand, they can worsen the situation in the targeted State. Furthermore, there is scant empirical evidence that would back the presumed compliance-inducing effects of economic sanctions at all. Within the WTO framework, empirical evidence also suggests that trade sanctions are inequitable as an enforcement method.[12] In this context, Gracia Marín Durán points out that the sanction-based approach can be a one-way enforcement mechanism for States with “stronger” economies, because the effects of sanctions on the sanctioning State are more likely to be mitigated by States with “stronger” rather than “weaker” economies. Lastly, the European Commission has argued[13] that the collaborative approach adopted by the EU seeks to strengthen the existing multilateral governance structure rather than to create a parallel legal structure and dispute settlement on environment and labour issues.[14]

Second, the collaborative approach, despite being less stringent, might be beneficial as it is effective in bringing sustainability issues to the attention of trading partners, and it can result in mutually satisfactory solutions. The collaborative approach also considers that a State’s failure to comply with its TSD commitments might not always be intentional. For some, the success of the collaborative approach was highlighted in the Panel of Experts’ proceedings under the EU-Korea FTA. In this case, the international standards on labour clause was relied upon as the basis for the claim.[15] The EU argued that certain provisions in the Korean Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act (TULRAA) were inconsistent with the fundamental labour right of freedom of association and that Korea had not made sufficient efforts to ratify four out of the eight Fundamental ILO Conventions. While determining that certain TULRAA provisions were inconsistent with the freedom of association, the Panel of Experts stated that Korea had not breached the TSD Chapter’s best-efforts obligation to ratify the Fundamental ILO Conventions. Instead, the Panel was of the view that Korea’s efforts satisfied the legal threshold of the provision as it is an “on-going obligation without a specific target date or schedule”.[16] It is noteworthy that Korea, nevertheless, ratified three of the four outstanding Fundamental ILO Conventions following the release of the panel report.[17]

  1. Assessing TSD Enforcement in Light of TSD Chapters’ Purpose(s) 

The current debate shows that neither of the above approaches is an easy fix to ensure compliance with TSD Chapters. Without suggesting final solutions, this section offers an alternative perspective of how to think about the pros and cons of a collaborative or a sanction-based approach as we link the choice of enforcement methods with the three underlying purposes of TSD Chapters: 1. Strengthening International Sustainability Standards, 2. Establishing a Level Playing Field, and 3. Mitigating Adverse Effects of the FTA Itself.

Purpose 1: Strengthening International Sustainability Standards 

TSD Chapters seek to promote respect for international rules on environmental protection and labour rights and include so-called international standards clauses. Typically, in TSD Chapters, the EU and its treaty partners “reaffirm their commitment to effectively implement” international standards.[18] These provisions seek, on the one hand, to maintain a minimum level of commitments in social and environmental matters and, on the other hand, to further the uptake and effective implementation of the existing international labour and environmental regimes. Importantly, they do not seek to establish a parallel system of normative sustainability standards in the FTA. For example, in order to strengthen international labour law, TSD Chapters include a reaffirmation of the parties’ commitment to implement all eight Fundamental ILO Conventions.[19] If a partner country has not yet ratified all eight conventions, an additional requirement for them is to “make continued and sustained efforts” towards the ratification of the remaining ones.[20] The EU-Korea Panel of Experts underlined the binding nature of this provision, but also that this provision imposes an obligation of effort, not of result.

In order to strengthen States’ commitments to existing international sustainability standards, the question of enforcement is critical. As mentioned above, States might be more likely to engage in substantive commitments to labour and the environment if the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are based on dialogue, cooperation, and consultations. The idea here is that collaborative mechanisms can open dialogue between trading partners on joint initiatives, for instance, at the ILO.[21] Given this latter point, the collaborative approach may, in some instances, be the better fit to foster the international sustainable development agenda as its success depends on the participation of all States.

Adhering to minimum international standards does not need to be required when the treaty has already entered into force but could operate during the negotiation process. An often-overlooked issue in the debate is the option of pre-ratification conditions, which a negotiating partner has to fulfil prior to entering into the FTA.

In the past, some trading partners of the EU have ratified international standards, before acceding to an FTA, without a formal obligation to do so. For example, ahead of the European Parliament’s discussion of whether to approve the EU-Viet Nam FTA, Viet Nam ratified the ILO Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (No. 98) and implemented a new labour law.[22] A month before the FTA entered into force, Viet Nam also ratified the ILO Convention on Forced Labour (No. 105).[23] For future TSD Chapters, it might thus be helpful to define pre-ratification requirements of key international conventions (instead of relying on the initiative of the trade partner) since their ratification brings about improvements in the national laws of treaty partners. Empirical evidence suggests that pre-ratification conditions have led to the improvement of labour standards in States that ultimately acceded to FTAs. For example, in the negotiation phase of several US FTAs, partner countries, such as Oman, Morocco, Bahrain, and Peru, amended their labour laws.[24] However, it is an open question whether all States would be willing to enter into FTA negotiations that included pre-ratification requirements.

Purpose 2: Establishing a Level Playing Field

The European Commission generally highlights the importance of fairness in global trade by ensuring a level playing field. This purpose can be categorised as “protectionist” purpose in the sense of seeking “to combat what is perceived to be “unfair” competitive advantage”.[25] For the Commission, the level playing field is a situation of “a market or industry in which all participants compete under the same conditions from regulatory and fiscal points of view.”[26] Establishing such a horizontal framework of economic relations focuses on regulatory issues, such as subsidies, taxation, and labour and environmental standards. Especially for the latter two, a conscious lowering of these standards by a State can increase investment and trade flows and result in an unfair competitive advantage.

Therefore, TSD Chapters include a clause regarding commitments not to weaken domestic labour and environmental protection levels. These so-called non-regression clauses typically refer to “upholding levels of protection” under domestic law, and, while they recognise States’ right to regulate, they provide for non-regression in ways that can be divided into two categories of impact: a) “to encourage” trade and/or investment, or b) “in a manner affecting” trade and/or investment. This means that non-regression clauses are subject to the condition of a nexus to trade or investment. The clauses define a weakening of levels of protection as a result of a) weakening laws, b) waiver or derogation, or c) failure to enforce. Unlike the international standards clause (discussed in the previous section), non-regression clauses concern standards under domestic laws.

Non-regression clauses are key commitments written in a binding way. Additionally, and only concerning labour standards, TSD Chapters contain a statement in which the parties “recognise that the violation of fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage and that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes”.[27] This shows that the EU pursues through its TSD Chapters also a “protectionist” purpose grounded in fear of unfair competition sparked by a “race to the bottom”. Non-regression clauses create a level playing field so that neither trade partner would seek trade and investment by cutting labour and environmental standards.

Lastly, it is important to note that the EU is more concerned about level playing field commitments when granting privileged market access to a major and/or geographically proximate trade partner because both market power and proximity can exacerbate – real or perceived – unfair competition. This position of the EU can be seen in the 2020 EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which contains a much stronger domestic non-regression clause than any of the FTAs concluded by the EU.[28] This can be explained by the fact that the EU has a unique economic relationship with the UK, the latter being a former Member State, when compared to other third countries that are more distant from the EU. In other words, non-regression clauses are of different importance in different settings. Hence, the enforcement method should also be assessed in light of the underlying economic relationship between the EU and its partners.

The sanctions-based approach, in particular, seems to be the better fit for certain trading partners to achieve compliance. As such, the EU-UK agreement not only incorporates a strong non-regression clause but also foresees sanctions in case of breach.[29] It could be challenging in practice to solve “unfair” competitive advantages through the collaborative approach, thus making a sanction-based model more attractive. For example, when countries lower their labour or environmental standards, there is usually an underlying economic interest, such as attracting more foreign investment. Potential trade sanctions could disincentivise trading partners from lowering their standards. It is interesting to note that the existing sanction-based enforcement mechanism under US FTAs only relates to non-regression clauses. The enforceability of non-regression clauses is relativised because they (as it is also the case for non-regression clauses in EU FTAs) require a nexus to trade or investment (“in a manner affecting” trade and/or investment). As the United States-Guatemala case highlighted, this threshold is difficult to establish and can hence render even a sanction-based enforcement mechanism de facto ineffective.[30] 

Purpose 3: Mitigating Adverse Effects of the FTA Itself

As a final question of purpose, we need to query what TSD Chapters offer to mitigate the adverse effects of the FTA itself? We should not assume that FTAs will not harm workers’ rights or the environment.

While the EU has paid less attention to this specific question, the EU has examined the potential impacts of FTAs prior to concluding them. Through Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs), the EU seeks to assess the potential impacts of FTAs. The goal of SIAs is to support negotiations by providing the European Commission with an ex-ante analysis of the potential economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts of envisaged agreements.[31] SIA practice has shown that impacts are often presented to be positive overall, even for labour conditions and environmental protection in the EU and in its trade partner countries.[32]

Despite the predicted positive effect of such ex-ante assessments, empirical studies on EU FTAs show that even with SIAs these agreements can have adverse effects on environment and labour once in force. For instance, a major study conducted by James Harrison et al. showed that the commercial provisions (namely, trade and investment liberalisation) of the EU-Korea FTA “shifted the competitive conditions in the Korean auto market and contributed to eroding [Hyundai Motor Group] profits, with adverse impacts on workers in more insecure and low-paid jobs, especially those located in the lower tiers of the production network”.[33]

It becomes clear that FTAs also require impact assessments during their application. In this respect, TSD Chapters contain provisions that foresee the review of the impacts of trade and investment agreements concerning the social, economic, and environmental conditions after the FTAs enter into force.[34] TSD Chapters generally provide that each trade partner commits “to review, monitor and assess the impact of the implementation of” the agreement in question on sustainable development within its territory “in order to identify any need for action that may arise in connection” with the agreement.[35] The reviews take place jointly or individually by the trade partners and are overseen by the specialised TSD Committees.

Currently, the obligations on conducting ex-post SIAs in EU TSD Chapters are, like the other TSD obligations, exempt from the general dispute settlement mechanism and fall under the collaborative approach.[36] For the third purpose of TSD Chapters, which is to ensure that the trade and investment agreement itself does not harm workers’ rights or the environment, the question arises again whether a sanction-based approach appears to be more desirable. In fact, the primary function of ex-post SIAs is to provide a review that should allow the trade partners to react to negative impacts and, if need be, to amend the agreement. In other words, collaboration and dialogue are required between the treaty parties, which, in turn, warrant a less confrontational sanction-based approach. It is more important that the review mechanisms and the SIA process are strengthened and implemented more seriously.

Especially once the agreement has entered into force, a much stronger, more rigorous methodology for investigating effects is required. If we now go a step further and think about for whom such evaluations are carried out, there is no getting around local civil society and the need to ensure their effective participation. Improving the review mechanism also implies that when a finding is made that the FTA or certain provisions of the FTA produce negative impacts (e.g., for local communities) on significant sustainability concerns, that concrete actions are taken by all treaty parties, including a potential amendment of the agreement.

  1. Conclusion

In this Blog Post, we have sought to add a new perspective to the debate on the effectiveness of TSD Chapters and their enforcement mechanism. We have shown that neither the collaborative nor the sanctions-based approach to TSD enforcement are a panacea for TSD compliance per se. Instead, different approaches might be suitable depending on the purpose one wants to achieve since no single TSD enforcement approach is ideal for reaching all goals simultaneously.

* Tensin Studer is Research Assistant at the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore and Fellow at the Ars Iuris Vienna Doctoral School, University of Vienna. The authors of the blog wish to thank N. Jansen Calamita, Charalampos Giannakopoulos, and Brian Chang for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Such consultations can, if requested, involve the specialised Committee on TSD (which oversees the implementation of the TSD Chapter), domestic advisory groups (DAGs), or joint meetings; and depending on the subject matter it can also involve expert advice coming from international organisations, such as the ILO. See, e.g., CETA Arts 23.9(4) and 24.14(4), providing for specialised Committees on TSD. See e.g., CETA, Art 24.13(5) providing for DAGs. See, e.g., CETA, Art 23.9(3); EUVFTA, Art 13.16(3); CETA Art 24.14(3) providing for expert advice from international organisations.
[2] E.g., CETA, Art 23.10(1); EUSFTA, Art 12.17(1); EUVFTA, Art 13.17(1).
[3] For example, under CETA, the panel members must be independent experts in either international environmental or international labour law, and additionally, in international dispute resolution (Art 23.10(7)). Under EUSFTA, the panel members must be independent experts in labour law or environmental law or international dispute resolution (Art 12.17(4)). The same modalities as for the EUSFTA apply to the EUVFTA (see Art 13.17(4)).
[4] E.g., CETA, Art 24.15(10); EUSFTA, Art 12.17(8); EUVFTA, Art 13.17(8).
[5] E.g., EUVFTA, Art 13.17(9); EUSFTA, Art 12.17(9); EUVFTA Art 13.17(9).
[6] In the follow-up procedure of some TSD Chapters (e.g., EUSFTA, EUVFTA), through domestic advisory groups (DAGs) and joint meetings, civil society can submit observations to the specialised Committees on TSD, thereby assisting in the monitoring process.
[7] United States: CAFTA-DR, Art 16.6(6); US-Peru FTA, Arts 17.7(6-7) and 18.12(6); US-Colombia FTA, Arts 17.7(6-7) and Art 18.12(6); US-Panama, Arts 16.7(6-7) and Art 17.11(6); US-Korea, Arts 19.7(4-5) and 20.9(6). However, the first generation of US FTAs only allowed to resort to consultations for issues falling under the chapter on the environment; see, e.g., US-Chile FTA, Art 19(6).
[8] E.g., US-Peru FTA, Arts 17.7(6) and 18.12(4)-(5)(a); US-Colombia FTA, Arts 17.7(6) and 18.12(4)-(5)(a); US-Panama, Arts 16.7(6) and 17.11(4)-(5)(a); US-Korea, Arts 19.7(4) and 20.9(3).
[9] E.g., US-Peru FTA, Arts 21.15 and 21.16.
[10] E.g., Marco Bronckers and Giovanni Gruni, ‘Retooling the Sustainability Standards in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (2021) 24 Journal of International Economic Law 25, 3; Paolo Mazzotti, ‘Stepping Up the Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in the European Union’s Free Trade Agreements: Reconsidering the Debate on Sanctions’ (European Law Institute 2021) 11–12 <https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/YLA_Award/Submission_ELI_Young_Lawyers_Award_Paolo_Mazzotti_2021.pdf> accessed 13 May 2022.
[11] European Parliament, Resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing Nature Back Into Our Lives (P9 TA(2021)0277), para 169.
[12] Remarks by Gracia Marín Durán, ‘Panel Discussion “Sustainable Development Chapters in EU Investment Agreements”’ (CIL, 10 Dec 2022) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1xKxfgixzI> accessed 13 May 2022.
[13] Commission Services, ‘Non-paper on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ 2017, 3 <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155686.pdf> accessed 13 May 2022.
[14] For example, when a party is not complying with one of the ILO Conventions, it would be more beneficial to foster the enforcement mechanisms of the ILO than to establish a parallel dispute settlement under a comprehensive FTA. See Axel Marx et al, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters of EU Trade Agreements’ (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 2017), 48-59 <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/vergaderstukken/2017/03/30/verslag-2e-tussentijdse-bijeenkomst-breed-handelsberaad-30-maart-2017/Dispute_Settlement_in_the_Trade_and_Sustainable_Development_Chapters_of_EU_Trade_Agreements.pdf> accessed 15 May 2022.
[15] EUKFTA, Art 13.4.3.
[16] EU-Korea Panel Report, para 288; The report is available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/january/tradoc_159358.pdf> accessed 15 May 2022.
[17] Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) – 20 Apr 2021; Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) – 20 Apr 2021; Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) – 20 Apr 2021. International Labour Organization, ‘International Labour Standards – Country Profile: Republic of Korea’ <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11110:0::NO::P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103123> accessed 13 May 2022; EUKFTA, 7th Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development Joint Minutes, 13-14 April 2021 <https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/2e6ac3df-18ba-4328-9571-4225c7f86468/details> accessed 10 May 2022.
[18] E.g., EUVFTA, Art 13.4(2) (for labour) and Art 13.5(2) (for environment). A different formulation can be found in the FTA with Mexico, i.e., “shall effectively implement”, see EUMFTA, TSD chapter, Art 4(2) (for environment).
[19] The eight Fundamental ILO Conventions are: (1) Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour No 29 [1930]; (2) Equal Remuneration Convention No 100 [1951]; (3) Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour No 105 [1957]; (4) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to Organise Convention No 87 [1948]; (5) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention No 98 [1949]; (6) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention No 111 [1958]; (8) Minimum Working Age Convention No 138 [1973]; (8) Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No 182 [1999].
[20] CETA, Art 23.3(4).
[21] Remarks by Laurance Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Panel Discussion “Sustainable Development Chapters in EU Investment Agreements”’ (CIL, 10 Dec 2022) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1xKxfgixzI> accessed 13 May 2022.
[22] International Labour Organization, ‘European Parliament Discusses EU-Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement’ (2 Dec 2019) <http://www.ilo.org/brussels/information-resources/WCMS_732061/lang–en/index.htm> accessed 13 May 2022.
[23] International Labour Organization, ‘International Labour Standards – Country Profile: Viet Nam’ <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11110:0::NO::P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103004> accessed 13 May 2022.
[24] International Labour Organization (International Institute for Labour Studies), ‘Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements’ (2015) 29 and 37 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—inst/documents/publication/wcms_228965.pdf> accessed 15 May 2022.
[25] Matilda Gillis, ‘Let’s Play? An Examination of the “Level Playing Field” in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (2021) 55 Journal of World Trade 715, 716.
[26] Matilda Gillis, ‘Let’s Play? An Examination of the “Level Playing Field” in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (2021) 55 Journal of World Trade 715, 718.
[27] EUMFTA, TSD chapter, Art 3(7); EUVFTA, Art 13.4(4). For a different formulation, see EUSFTA, Art 12.1(3).
[28] EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Art 387 (labour) and Art 391 (environment).
[29] EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Art 410(3).
[30] United States-Guatemala Panel Report, para 594; The report can be accessed here <http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/usa_cafta/Dispute_Settlement/final_panel_report_guatemala_Art_16_2_1_a_e.pdf> accessed 15 May 2022. 
[31] The human rights impact assessment forms part of SIAs since 2015. See European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Analysis of Human Rights Impacts in Impact Assessments for Trade-related Policy Initiatives’, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> accessed 15 May 2022.
[32] Overview of recent ex-ante SIAs, see Stefanie Schacherer, Sustainable Development in EU Foreign Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 2021) 279-292.
[33] James Harrison et al, ‘South Korea’s Automotive Labour Regime, Hyundai Motors’ Global Production Network and Trade‐Based Integration with the European Union’ (2021) 59 British Journal of Industrial Relations 139, 141.
[34] European Commission, ‘Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment’, 2nd ed, 2016, 8.
[35] E.g., EUVFTA, Art 13.13; CETA, Art 22.3(3).
[36] E.g., EUVFTA Arts 13.13, 13.16(1).